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Michael S. Greve*

The Non-Reformation of
Administrative Law: Standing to Sue
and Public Interest Litigation in
West German Environmental Law

I.

Introduction

This Article examines the German doctrine of standing to sue
(Klagebefugnis) in environmental disputes, as it has developed in legislation and litigation during the past two decades. The standing requirements imposed by German law prevent private parties from litigating on
behalf of collective, "public" interests; they even prevent environmental
associations from litigating on behalf of their members. 1 Although environmental associations have persistently demanded reforms that would
allow them to litigate on behalf of their members and the public, the
courts have generally refused to relax standing barriers in environmental disputes. 2 Furthermore, the legislature (Bundestag) of the Federal
Republic of Germany has not followed the United States Congress in
passing environmental statutes under which "any citizen" or "any person" can bring suit against a private party in violation of the act or
against the administrator for failure to perform a non-discretionary
duty. In the United States, virtually every major environmental statute
contains such a "citizen suit" provision. 3 Considering the two nations'
* Director, Center for Individual Rights, Washington, D.C. Diploni (Political
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on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. Infra notes 23-28, 84-97 and accompanying text.
2. Infra notes 84-85, 160-61 and accompanying text.
3. The first citizen suit provision in an environmental statute was § 304 of the
1970 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982). Congress wrote this provision, with
only slight modifications, into many other environmental statutes. E.g., § 505 of the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982). In recent years, Congress has come to modify and expand citizen suit provisions. E.g., § 7002 of the
22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 197 (1989)
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different legal traditions, West German environmental statutes resemble
American laws to a surprisingly large extent. 4 Nevertheless, none of the
German environmental statutes authorizes citizen suits; nor does the
general administrative code.
Justiciability doctrines-ripeness, mootness, finality, sovereign
immunity, and especially standing to sue-are not mere legal technicalities. Their content and application have a significant impact upon governmental organization, especially upon the relation between the
bureaucracy and the courts, and upon the channels through which, and
the means by which, individual and collective social interests are represented in the political process.
The virtual demise of standing in the United States 5 was the centerpiece of "public interest" litigation, or lawsuits brought for the vindication not of private rights but of collective, "public" interests. The rapid
growth of public interest actions was equivalent to what has appropriately been termed "the reformation of American administrative law." 6
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the focus of American administrative
law shifted from the protection of individual rights to the protection of
"under-represented interests." The premise of this reformation was
that certain non-economic, collective, "public" interests were systematically under-represented in the political process, especially in administrative agencies that were "captured" by the economic interests they were
supposed to regulate. Under-represented interests, therefore, had to be
afforded special protection by the judiciary. The environment quickly
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, (RCRA) 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982). The
only major environmental statute without a citizen suit provision is the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 135-36(y) (1982).
4. Cf., e.g., the example of air pollution control, as described by Currie, Air Pollution Control in W1'est Germany, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 355, 391-92 (1982).
5. This description may seem a bit exaggerated, considering some restrictive
justiciability decisions of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. See, e.g., Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S.
464 (1982); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); and
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). However, the Supreme Court has applied a
restrictive approach only in selected areas and in an unsystematic fashion. Chayes,
The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). In many areas of public policy and administrative decisionmaking, and especially in the environmental context, constitutional justiciability standards are dramatically lower than those demanded by statute. E.g. United States v.
Students to Challenge Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP I), 412 U.S. 669
(1973) and Duke Power Co. v. North Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S.
59 (1978). Article III barriers to congressional creation of citizen suit provisions and
of private rights of action to redress public wrongs are minimal, if not non-existent.
See Connelly, Congressional Authority to Expand the Cla3s of Persons with Standing to Seek
Judicial Review' of .4geno"Rulemaking, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 139, 162-64 (1987). Since
Congress has written citizen suit provisions into virtually every major environmental
statute, supra n. 3, environmental plaintiffs have standing to sue under all but the
most unusual of circumstances. See id.
6. Stewart, The Reformation of .. merican Adiinistratize Law, 88 HARV. L. Riv. 1667.
1716 (1975) (expansion of standing to sue has been a key component of the reformation of administrative law).
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became the focus of public interest litigation, both quantitatively 7 and
doctrinally. 8 The indisputably public character of clean air and water
made a legal system that protected private rights, but at the same time
ignored the negative externalities of production and consumption,
approaches which seem clearly dysfunctional. Special legal protection
of the public's interests in a clean and healthy environment seemed particularly urgent.
Although the rapid growth of public interest actions in the United
States was unparalleled in any other country, 9 it was widely perceived
not as an American peculiarity, but as a reflection of the increasing need
to represent vital public interests in a complex, collectivist society. 10
The rather uncritical and, by now, near-universal acceptance of public
interest litigation in the United States partially reflects the conviction
that lawsuits on behalf of collective interests are a necessary, functional
response to social needs and systemic government failures."I
If this is true, the law should have become more hospitable to collective plaintiffs and public interests in both the United States and other
industrial societies, which are as complex and interdependent as American society and face similar difficulties in protecting broad public and
collective interests. Indeed, the author of a 1975 article found a "general and growing trend in much of Western Europe-the supplementation, or integration, of governmental intervention with private initiative
in safeguarding emerging collective interests, and the channeling of
such initiatives into associative forms."' 2 At least on the surface, it
appears that many common law and civil law countries have continued
to reduce standing requirements and to create statutory exceptions to
13
restrictive constitutional or common law justiciability doctrines.
West Germany seems to be no exception to this trend. During the
7. For quantitative data on environmental litigation, see L. WENNER, THE ENVI-

(1982).
8. Dwyer, Contentiousness and Cooperation in Environmental Regulation, 35 AM. J.
Comp L. 809 (1987) (modern American administrative law took shape in struggle
over environmental policy).
RONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT

9. See generally Sward & Weisbrod, Public Interest Activities Outside the US., in PUBLTC INTEREST LAw 500 (B. Weisbrod, J. Handler & N. Komesar eds. 1978).
10. E.g., Cappelletti, Governmental and Private Advocatesfor the Public Interest in Civil

Litigation: .4Comparative Study, 73 MICH. L. REV. 793, 856, 879-80 (1975).
11. This view underlies Stewart's influential article, supra note 6, at 1712, 1811.
Political support for instruments for collective litigation is also partially premised on
the idea that such mechanisms are necessary to cope with novel political and substantive problems. E.g., Muskie, Tort, Transportation, and Pollution: Do The Old Shoes Still

Fit? 7 HARV.J. LEGIs. 477, 491 (1972). Senator Muskie is the principal author of the
1970 Clean Air Act, including its citizen suit provision.
12. Cappelletti, supra note 10, at 864.
13. See, e.g., Bryden, Public Interest Intenetion in the Courts, 66 CANADA BAR REV.
490, 493-94 (1987) (Canada); Groenendijk, Litigation. Politics and Publicity: Public Mterest Law or How to Share the Burden of Change, 14 ANGLO-Am. L. REv. 337 (1985) (Netherlands); O'Connor, Reflections on the Preclusion ofJudicialReview, in England and the United
States, 27 WM. & MARY L. REX'. 643 (1986) (England).
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1970s, German administrative courts' 4 expanded private rights' 5 and
lowered standing barriers in environmental litigation. 16 Federal and
state legislatures have made some small steps towards increasing the
representation of environmental organizations in the administrative
process. 17
Nevertheless, these trends have been extremely limited, at least in
comparison to the reformation of American administrative law. Despite
the increased fuzziness of justiciability doctrines, and despite instances
of collective litigation under the guise of individual rights, German environmental law still focuses almost exclusively upon the protection of private, individual rights, and is still hostile towards public interest
litigation and ideological, "non-Hohfeldian" plaintiffs.18 Since the early
1980s, the courts have actually tightened standing requirements and
reduced the scope ofjudicial review of administrative decisions in various areas of environmental law.' 9
The limited nature of the "collectivization" of German law is
instructive because it casts doubt upon the assertion that the development of public interest litigation is a "major trend of universal dimensions ' 20 and a reflection of a functional need of industrial societies.
Public interest litigation did not simply fail to come about in the Federal
Republic. German courts and legislatures faced considerable political
pressure to implement legal reforms that would allow public interest litigation in the environmental protection area. 2 ' Nevertheless, the courts
considered the option-and rejected it. Thus, we are faced with the paradox that Germany, a country that feels quite comfortable with collective,
organized forms of political action, rejected public interest litigation;
whereas the United States, a country known for its individualistic political culture and suspiciousness of organized interests, not only allows
14. German administrative courts should not be confused with intra-agency tribunals and Administrative LawJudges in the United States. The German administrative
judiciary is independent, and not a part of the bureaucracy. It is called "administrative" because it deals exclusively with matters of administrative law.
15. In German law, legal claims individuals possess against the state are called
subjektive 6ffentliche Rechte ("subjective public rights"): "subjektive," so as to distinguish
the "subjective" sense of the word Recht (a right) from its "objective" sense (law);
"'ofentliche," because these rights exist under public (as opposed to private, i.e., civil)
law and against the state (as opposed to other private parties). "Subjektive ffentliche
Rechie" are uniformly understood to be individual rights. A literal translation ("public
rights") might be mistakenly understood as referring to (presumptive) rights held
not by individuals but by the public qua public. This is exactly the opposite of the
intended meaning. The translation "individual rights" or "private rights" captures
the substantive meaning of "subjektive 6ffentliche Rechie."
16. hIfra notes 68-79, 125-26 and accompanying text.
17. hifia notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
18. hIfra notes 84-85, 128-36, 160-61 and accompanying text. For the concept of
a "non-Hohfeldian plaintiff" seeJaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public .ctions: The NonHohfeldian or Ideological Plaintif, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1003 (1968).
19. See infra notes 80-83, 160-61 and accompanying text.
20. Cappelletti, Vindicating the Public hIterest Through the Cou'ts: .4 Comparativist
Contribution, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 643, 690 (1976).
21. Infra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
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public interest litigation, but encourages it through awards of attorney
fees. 2 2 This Article argues that the reasons for this apparent paradox lie
in different legal traditions and institutional arrangements.
II. Public Interest Litigation in West Germany: The Legal
and Political Context
West Germany's legal system is built upon a firm distinction between
individual private rights, which are protected by an independent judiciary, and political issues, which are committed to other branches of government. The understanding of rights as fundamentally different from
the political concerns of groups or the public is constitutionally sanctioned. The Basic Law provides that if someone is violated "in his
rights" by a governmental authority, legal redress-access to courtshall be available. 23 "Rights" means private, individual (especially constitutional) rights, and the provision is generally interpreted as a preclusion of litigation on behalf of anything but private rights. Plaintiffs
without individual rights-i.e., "public interest" plaintiffs-do not and,
according to most scholars of constitutional law, generally must not have
access to court. 24 Exceptions can be created only by the legislature and
must be limited in scope and number. 2 5 At the sub-constitutional,
administrative level, the general administrative law code prohibits litigation of claims that are not private rights. Unless otherwise determined
by statute, lawsuits are admissible only if the plaintiff asserts, with at
least some plausibility, 26 that an administrative action has violated his
22. The Supreme Court has noted that there are more than 150 fee-shifting provisions in federal statutes. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983).
Environmental statutes usually authorize fee shifting. E.g., Clean Air Act sec. 307, 42
U.S.C. § 7607 (1982); Federal Water Pollution Control Act sec. 505, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365 (1982) (as amended, 1987); RCRA sec. 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982); and

Toxic Substances Control Act sec. 19, 15 U.S.C. § 2618. A good description of fee
shifting and reimbursement in the environmental context isJ. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS:
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWs 95-130 (1987). Data
on awards of attorney's fees, intervenor fees, and discretionary grants to public interest law firms can be found in M.

GREVE & J. KELLER, FUNDING THE LErr: THE
SOURCES OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRMS (1987).
23. GRUNDGESETZ art. 19, § 4 (W. Ger.) ("lirdjemand durch die 6ffentliche Gewalt in

seimen Rechten verletzt, steh ilim der Rechisweg offen"). "Offentliche Gewalt" means executive
authority; "Rechtsweg" means access to court.

24. E.g., F.

WEYREUTHER, VERWALTUNGSKONTROLLE DURCH VERBAENDE?

17, 93-95

(1975). Cf also the discussion hifra notes 204-19 and accompanying text.

25. The extent of the legislature's authority in this regard is somewhat controversial. Nevertheless, most scholars argue that legislative statutes dispensing with the
requirement that plaintiffs assert violations of individual rights have to be carefully
limited. E.g., F. WEYREUTHER, supra note 24, at 17-18; Burmeister, Die l'erbandsklagein
veifasswigsrechtlicher Sicht, in RECHTSFRAGEN DES GENEHMIGUNGSVERFAHRENS VON
KERNKRAFTWERKEN 7-36 (Boerner ed., 1978). But cf., e.g., Breuer, lWirksamerer Unwellschut: durch Reform des Verwaltungsverfahrens- wnd Ierwaltlngsprozessrechts?, 1978 NEUE

JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIr 1558, 1560 (legislature faces no constitutional obstacles in expanding standing and creating instruments of collective litigation).
26. There is an ongoing dispute over the precise scope of the plaintiff's duty to
substantiate his claim. The various theories are discussed at length by P. NEUMEYER,
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rights. 27 The explicit purpose of this provision is to prohibit public
interest litigation (Popularklagen),28 and to orient judicial review of
administrative action towards the protection of individual ("subjective")
rights. Judicial control of bureaucracy is not the purpose of litigation
under administrative statutes but merely an incidental effect of the protection of private rights.
Under these doctrines and statutes, many bureaucratic decisions on
environmental matters are de facto exempt from judicial control. For
example, a landowner's decision to cut down trees on his property without a permit, or with an administrative permit granted in violation of the
law, is none of his neighbor's legal business. 29 Similarly, an administrator's decision to build a highway through a national park or a recreation
area can rarely be reviewed by the judiciary, because no private property
rights are violated. Plaintiffs who try to go to court over such matters
regularly lose for lack of proper standing to sue.
Nevertheless, environmental values and legal provisions can be
enforced through the judiciary if they happen to coincide with someone's private rights. This is generally the case with large construction
projects such as airports, chemical and power plants, highways, and particularly nuclear reactors. Because the widespread effects of industrial
facilities create a large number of actual and potential plaintiffs, virtually
every large-scale project will end up in court sooner or later. Litigation
produces frequent delays and, on occasion, the cancellation of construction projects. 30 Since large projects require several permits, each of
which can be challenged in court, construction can drag on indefinitely,
clogging the courts' dockets for years. 3 ' This led to particularly serious
DIE KLAGEBEFUGNIS IM VER\VALTUNGSPROZESS 25-29 1976. According to the domi-

nant opinion, a mere assertion is insufficient to confer standing; a violation of the
plaintiff's individual rights must at least be possible. In environmental cases, plaintiffs are often subject to tougher requirements. See Baumann, Betroffensein dinrth
Grolvorhaben, 1982 BAYERISCHE VERWALTUNGSBLXTrER 257 and 1982 BAYERISCHE
VERWALTUNGSBLX'rrER 292, at 263-65.

27. Verwaltingsgericitsordnung§ 42(2) (Administrative Judiciary Statute) [hereinafter I'wGO]: ("Soweit gesetzlich nichis anderes bestimmit ist, ist die Klage ntr :uh'ssig, wemi der
Kteiger geltend macht, durich den 1'evalthngsaki oder seine .-blehmnng oder Unerlassmig in
seinen Rechten verlett zn sein." ("Unless othenise determined by law, the suit is admissible only if the plaintiff claims to be violated in his rights by the administrative action
or its denial or omission") (Author's translation). Cf. also I'wGO 113(1).
28. E. EYERMANN, L. FR6HLER & J. KORMANN, KOMMENTAR ZUR VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSORDNUNG 271, 275 (§ 42 nos. 121, 130) (9th ed. 1988).
29. B1'erwG, 1975 DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWAIrUNc. 605. The Court regarded this
complaint as a suit brought by qizis ex poputo.
30. Cf. the examples discussed by Ronellenfitsch, Die Dnrchseltnng slaaltlicher Etischeidnngen als I'erfassingsproblem, in UMWELT, VERFASSUNG, VERWALTUNG 13-35
(Boerner ed., 1982); Bliimel, Die Standorivorsogeplang fii" Kernkrafiwerke nnd a dere
4
im-weltrelevane Grobvorhaben in der Bindesrepnblik Deutschland, 1977 DEU'TSCHES VERWAt.TUNGSBLiT 301, nn. 1-37.

31. Courts have failed to find ways of avoiding multiple objections to one and the
same project. Traditional doctrines of claim and issue preclusion seem inadequate to
the task. Rengeling, Uniweltschutz im l envaltingsverfahrens-nind I 'ern'altngspro-essrect,I
1978 JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 453, 456-57.
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difficulties in the area of nuclear power. By the late 1970s, time-consuming litigation against every reactor 32 and waste storage facility
thwarted the government's energy program-a program based on the
33
extensive use of nuclear power.
From the perspective of environmental groups and advocates of
public interest litigation, however, a legal system that tied the availability
ofjudicial review to individual standing to sue had a decisive disadvantage: challenges to particular permits or licenses do not per se ensure
vigorous law enforcement. With the exception of nuclear power regulation where, due to the requirements of the licensing process and the
large classes of potentially affected parties, every administrative action
of consequence can be challenged in court, lawsuits against individual
polluters do not lead to systematic judicial control of bureaucratic decision-making. Litigation is generally not a viable option when the
bureaucracy refuses to act with sufficient speed or energy; refuses to act
at all; or bargains away environmental requirements in negotiations with
regulated industries.
When it appeared that the bureaucracy failed to enforce fully the
legislature's ambitious substantive statutes, the general lack of a remedy
for administrative inaction or lack of zeal became a focal point of the
academic and political debate over environmental protection. The case
of clean air legislation 3 4 indicates that the charge of inadequate enforcement is not unfounded. Under the BImSchG, the bureaucracy possesses
highly coercive enforcement powers, including partial or complete plant
closures.3 5 However, because formal enforcement proceedings entail
delay through litigation, high costs, and the risk of losing cases, the
bureaucracy usually seeks to implement environmental law through
informal bargaining with applicant-firms. 3 6 The resulting agreements,
32. Ossenbiihl, Die gerichtiliche Uberpnifng der Beurteihnng technischer mid wirtschaftlicher Fragen in Genehmigungen des Baus von Kernkraftwerken, 1978 DElTrscHEs VERWALTUNGSBLATr 1. By 1980, the courts had already handed down more than 100 decisions

concerning nuclear

reactors. ALBERS, GENEHMIGUNGEN DES BAUS VON KERNKRAFTWERKEN, 5-26 (1980). Since then, the flood of lawsuits has continued. Cf the

comprehensive discussion of the case law concerning nuclear and conventional
power plants in DREISEROTH, GROSSKRAFrWERKE VOR GERICHT (1986).
33. Listl, Die Entscheidungsprdrogatihedes Parlanents fib- die Errichtung von Kernkrafwerken, 1978 DEutrscHEs VERWALTUNGSBLATr 10, 17 (siting and licensing

processes "factually collapsed").
34. The principal statute regulating air pollution (as well as noise and certain
other environmental problems) is the Bundesinnnissionsschntzgesetz [hereinafter
"BhnSchG"] (federal environmental protection law), a rough equivalent of the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642 (1982). Germany has regulated certain problems of
air pollution, such as vehicle emissions, not in the BhiSchG but in other statutes. An
overview of air pollution law is Currie, Air Polltion Control in Germany, 49 U. CH. L.
REV.

355 (1982).

35. BiSchG §§ 20, 21, 25.
36. There is extensive legal and empirical literature on the informal enforcement
of environmental law. E.g. BOMNE, DER INFORMALE REcHTSSTAAT (1982); hzfo-lmles
Handeln in Gesetzesvollkug, in ORGANISATION UND RECHT 20 (7 Jahrbuch fuer Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie; 1980); hiformales Handeln in Gesetzesvollzng, 75 VERWALTUNGs-ARCHiv 343 (1984); Eberle, Arrangements in 'erwaltngsverfahren, 17 DIE
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such as extensions of statutory deadlines, solicitation of a promise to
clean up an old plant in exchange for a license for a new one, and installation of workable (as opposed to the "best available") pollution control
technology, often fall short of what the letter of the law demands.
The charge of an "enforcement deficit," which quickly became the
key argument for public interest litigation,3 7 had some basis in fact, but
it was brought primarily for the polemical purpose3 8 of discrediting the
bureaucracy and justifying demands for public interest litigation and
increased judicial intervention in the administrative process. In other
words, it served the same purpose as complaints about the "capture" of
regulatory agencies in the United States, which were also put to polemical uses3 9 and upon which the German complaints about "enforcement
deficits" were based. 40 There was little evidence to suggest that the
enforcement of environmental law differed from the enforcement of
other statutes, 4 1 or that a bargaining approach is a less effective way of
ensuring compliance and of attaining policy objectives than the adver42
sarial, litigious enforcement style of American administrative agencies.
Indeed, the bold assertion that environmental deterioration was caused
by the bureaucracy's refusal or reluctance to enforce binding legal
requirements was shown to be largely incorrect when the first serious
studies of enforcement were conducted. 4 3 By then, however, environmentalists as well as many politicians and legal scholars were convinced
that ambitious substantive rules and standards were likely to be ineffective unless they were accompanied by far-reaching procedural
VERWALTUNG 439 (1984); Ladeur, Mom Gesetzesvollzug zur stralegischen Rechltsforbildung,
1979 LEVIATHAN 339; Westheide, Branchenbezogene Zusagen und Abkommeu als histrument
aus der Praxis des produkibezogenen Urnwelischutzes, in DOKUMENTATION ZUR 7. WISSENSCHAFTLICHEN FACHTAGUNG DER GESELLSCHAFT FOR UMWELTRECHT 156 (1983).
37. Cf REHBINDER, BURGBACHER & KNIEPER, BURGERKLAGE IM UMWELTRECHT
(1972) [hereinafter "REHBINDER"]. The case against group litigation is made most

persuasively by F. WEYREUTHER, supra note 24.

38.

BOHNE, DER INFORMALE RECHTSSTAAT

22 (1981).

39. The academic origin of the "capture" theory is M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING
BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955). The theory was put to political use
by the nascent public interest movement in its efforts to reform the regulatory process. E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK (1982) discusses the point and
cites examples of reports and studies, conducted by Ralph Nader's organizations,
that are based on this theory.
40. The first and most elaborate exposition of the "enforcement deficit" as a
compelling rationale for public interest litigation is REHBINDER, supra note 37. The
study is based almost entirely upon the American literature and experience. It
appeared before much was known about the extent of enforcement deficits in the
Federal Republic-in fact, before most German environmental statutes were passed.
41. Skouris, Uber die 'erbandsklage im I'erwaltungsprozess, 1982 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFr 100, 104; BOHNE, DER INFORMALE RECHTSSTAAT 34 (1982).
42. D. VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATIONS 23 (1986) (Britain's emphasis
on voluntary compliance with environmental regulation has not proven any more or

less effective than the adversarial regulatory approach in the United States); E.
BARDACH & E. KAGAN, supra note 39, at 101-19 (1982).
43. Mayntz & Hucke, Gesel-esvollzug im Lmweltschutz, ll'irksamkeil und Problem, I
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR UMWELTPOLITIK 220 (1978).
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reforms.44
Some reform proposals centered on the increased participation of
environmental groups and voluntary neighborhood associations in the
administrative process. 45 While administrative proceedings are not
nearly as formal in Germany as they are in the United States, some rudimentary participation requirements do exist. General administrative law
requires notice and comment for parties whose rights may be affected by
a particular bureaucratic decision. 4 6 Environmental statutes frequently
contain more elaborate procedures, and expand the circle of participants beyond the narrow bounds of persons whose rights are directly
affected. For example, most planning and licensing proceedings for
industrial plants and nuclear reactors require hearings which anyone can
attend. 4 7 Environmental groups regularly attend these hearings. 48
Nevertheless, participation has often proven to be too little, too late.
When projects are submitted for public comment, all important decisions have already been reached in49informal negotiations between the
applicant firm and the bureaucracy.
It is most unlikely that more extensive procedural requirements,
such as more formal proceedings, a more elaborate record, or an additional round of hearings at an earlier stage, would change this situation.
In the context of administrative procedure, the sharp distinction
between public power and authority on the one hand and the legal
rights of private citizens on the other, results in distinctions between
those who want to be heard to protect their rights against the state, and
those who want to "participate" for other and mostly political reasons.
44. REHBINDER, supra note 37, at 15-17; and Breuer, [Firksanierer mweltschutiz durich

Reform des Verwaltugsverfahrens- und tennaltungsprozessrechlts?, 1978 NEUE

JURISTISCHE

WOCHENSCHRIFr 1558, 1559.
45. The literature on participation and the administrative process is voluminous.
A good overview of the literature and of legal developments in the area is FROEHZEITIGE BORGERBETEILIGUNGEN BEI PLANUNGEN

(Bltimel ed. 1982).

46. Verwaltungsve~fahrensgesetz §§ 28, 66-71 (Administrative Procedure Act) [hereinafter "VlwljG'1.
47. The pertinent provisions are scattered throughout the BISchG, the AtG, regulatory statutes issued pursuant to these laws, and the general administrative codes.
The general and most relevant provisions are BISdiG § 10. Bundesmis-

sionsschutzverordnung (9. BISchl'O), AtG § 7, Atonrechtliche l'efahrensverordnung §§ 4-7
(nuclear licensing procedures statute) [hereinafter "411Y"', and J'aJorG] §§ 17-19.
These procedural arrangements are quite complex and beyond the scope of this Article. General overviews are GRAFFE, DIE BETEILIGUNG DES BORGERS AM UMwELT-

SCHUTZRECHTLICH RELEVANTEN VERFAHREN UNTER BESONDERER BEROCKSICHTIGUNG
DES VERWALTUNGSVERFAHRENSGESETZES (1980); and SCHMEL, MASSENVERFAHREN VOR
DEN VERNVALTUNGSBEH6ERDEN UND DEN VERWALTUNGSGERICHTEN (1982).

48. The technical and legal problems posed by these so-called .1Iassemelfahren
and by the participation of organized groups are described and discussed by Schmel,
supra note 47; Naumann, l'erbandsklagetivd Massenprozess, 1975 GEWERBE-ARCHiV 281;
and Gerhard & Jacob, .1lasseuverfahren und .llusteiprozess vor den l'enraltnigsgerichten,
1982 DIE 6FFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 345.
49. Schmidt, OrganisierteEinwirkungen af die l'enraltung, 33 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN
DES VERBANDS DEUTSCHER STAATSRECHTSLEHRER 183, 194 (1975); see also supra notes

36 and 37.
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Due process is required when substantive rights are likely to be affected,
but concerned citizen participation in bureaucratic processes is
discretionary.
This theory is not based on cynicism. Informal hearings, held at the
bureaucracy's discretion and in accordance with its own judgment, serve
useful purposes: they help the bureaucracy gather information, assess
public attitudes, consider objections that, although legally inconsequential, may be important for some other reason, and so forth. If participants whose rights are not affected by the proceedings were allowed to
demand and obtain a judicial remedy for any procedural mistakes the
bureaucracy may have made, all hearings would be pressed into a
straightjacket of formal, legalistic proceedings, which might well defeat
50
their purpose.
In any event, German administrative law does not normally recognize procedural claims in the absence of substantive private rights.
Although the courts and especially the Federal Constitutional Court
have increasingly come to recognize the value and importance of adequate administrative procedures for the protection of personal liberty
and constitutional rights, 51 statutory law and judicial doctrines continue
to insulate many of the bureaucracy's substantive decisions against procedural challenges. Neither participation in agency proceedings, -'2 nor
procedural mistakes automatically confer standing to sue.5 3 Procedural
flaws will only render an administrative action null and void when the
mistake is "obviously" and "especially grave."'5 4 Plaintiffs are permitted
to challenge the violation of only those procedures that serve to protect
them as individuals-i.e., their own substantive rights. Even violations
of procedures designed to protect individuals may not invalidate the
bureaucracy's substantive decision. Mistakes may be remedied after the
fact. 5 5 Furthermore, plaintiffs have the often difficult task of showing
50. One may think of these proceedings as the analogue of the kind of hearing
held from time to time by Congress or agencies such as the Civil Rights Commission
in the United States. No one thinks that these hearings shotld be subject to due
process requirements, and for good reason, Congress has kept them very informal.
51. Cf 53 BvefGE 30, 65 ("Miilheim-Kirlich"). and the extensive discussions of
procedural mistakes and their legal consequences by F. Ht'FEx, FEHLER tIN
VERIWALTUNGSVERFAHREN and ZUR SYSTEMATIK DER FOLGEN VON VERFAtIRENSFE1iLERN, 1986 DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLA.Tr 69 (1988).
52. Cf iifra notes 100-04 and accompanying text. The difference to the United
States may not seem all that great in this regard. At least one federal appellate court
has also said that participation in agency proceedings. absent injury in fact, does not
confer standing to sue. Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Transp. and
Safety Admin., 793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986) vacated, Center for Auto Safety v.
Thomas 856 F.2d 1557 (D.C. 1988). But this decision is of les; practical relevance
than the corresponding doctrine in Germany. since the standards of "injury in fact"
are so much lower in the United States. Cenlerfor Auto Safety has also been harshl%
criticized as at odds with numerous other cases. See Connelly, supra note 5,at 149-53.
167.
53. Kloepfer, Rechtsschut: hi t.'mweltschut:. 76 VERW.ALTUNGS-ARcHiv 371. 384

(1985) (discussing the Federal Constitutional Court's decisions).
54. I'wtfG § 44(1).
55. Id. § 45.
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have reached a different result, had it not
that the bureaucracy could
56
violated procedural rules.
While allowing environmental groups to be heard, then, statutory
law and judicial doctrines insulate the bureaucracy's substantive decision against outside interference. These doctrines do not expand the
class of qualified plaintiffs; they do not increase the leverage of outside
interveners in the bureaucracy; and they do not result in tighter judicial
control of administrative decision-making. For these reasons, the advocates of heightened judicial scrutiny regarded the idea of limiting
reforms to matters of administrative procedure as insufficient, and
insisted that public interest litigation-standing to sue without a private
rights test-was the only effective means of eliminating the enforcement
deficit.
There are two ways of institutionalizing public interest litigation.
First, the concept of individual, private rights can be stretched, by piecemeal judicial expansion, so as to embrace essentially public interests,
such as generalized concerns about public health and welfare. Part III
discusses the limited developments in this direction in the context of
environmental litigation in West Germany. Second, public interest litigation can be instituted by legislative authorizations of individual or collectively organized private attorneys general. Within limits, the German
legislature is free to pass statutes that relax standing barriers and other
requirements to obtain judicial review. 5 7 In a few instances, the legislature has made use of this opportunity and extended to groups a statutory right to sue without invoking their own or even their members'
rights. 58 Environmental advocates and lawyers sympathetic to their
56. Id. § 46. A fairly typical application of this rule in the environmental context
is OVG Li'neburg, 1978 ENERGIEWIRTSCHAFTLICHE TAGESFRAGEN 36, 37. Plaintiff contested a construction permit for the Brokdorf nuclear reactor on the grounds that the
administrator, in clear violation of a non-discretionary statutory provision, had failed
to make certain documents pertaining to the reactor available for public inspection
and comment. The court upheld the permit because observance (or violation) of the
procedural provision would not have affected the administrator's substantive decision. Concerning the significance of § 46 of the nuclear power law, cf. generally
Ossenbuehl, Zur Bedeutung von Veifahrensnuihigehl in Alomrecht, 1981 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFr 375. Procedural mistakes and their legal consequences under the
BhiSchG are discussed extensively by CLOOSTERS, RECHTSSCHtrrz DRITrER GEGEN
VERFAHRENSFEHLER

IM IMMISSIONSSCHUTZRECHTLICHEN

GENEHMIGUNGSVERFAHREN

(1986).
57. VwGO § 42(2) demands a claim of violations of rights for the admissibility of a
suit only insofar as nothing else is determined by statutory law. It is not entirely clear
to what extent the legislature can make use of this option. Limited exceptions are
clearly permitted. EYERMANN, FR6HLER & KORMANN, supra note 28, at 274 (§ 42 no.
127). On the other hand, the introduction of public interest litigation across the
board would run afoul of the constitutionally sanctioned principle of individual legal
protection. Id. Cf notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
58. Gesel: gegen inlauieren Il~'iibewerb § 13(1) (Unfair Competition Act) [hereinafter
"TI'G"], for example, grants competitors in the same line of business, trade associations, and certain consumer associations a right to seek injunctive relief against the
unfair trading practices prohibited by the statute. Similarly, Geset: zur Regehng der
allgemeinen Geschfitsbedingingen § 13(2) (Standard Contract Terms Act) [hereinafter
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cause argue that similar opportunities for collective litigation should be
implemented in environmental law. Legislative efforts in this arena will
be described in Part IV.
III. Environmental Litigation
Environmental lawsuits over construction projects have a tripartite
structure. Private parties may challenge an administrative license, building or operation permit granted to another private party. Until the
1950s, lawsuits contesting administrative decisions in someone else's
favor were inadmissible under German administrative law; only the
"addressee" of an administrative action had standing to challenge it.
Since then, however, third-party litigation has become quite common.
Lawsuits are brought most frequently by real estate owners whose property value deteriorates as a result of an administrative action benefiting
someone else (so-called "neighborhood lawsuits"), and by business
firms whose competitors are subsidized or otherwise publicly supported.
In order to have such a case examined on the merits, the plaintiff must
assert a legal interest. Such an interest exists only if he can invoke a
"protective norm," i.e., a rule that "intends" his protection. Such protection has to be thepurpose of the norm, not merely its efect. 59 Conceptually as well as in practice, these requirements are considerably more
restrictive than the "injury in fact" test adopted by American courts.6 0
"AGBG'J eliminates individual standing requirements by allowing consumer associations to seek injunctive relief against certain prohibited clauses in standard contracts.
However, these and the few other existing statutory provisions for collective litigation are described by WOLF, DIE KLAGEBEFUGNIS DER VERBANDE (1971); VON FALCKENSTEIN,

(1977);

DIE

BEKXiMPFUNG

UNLAUTJERER

GESCHXFrSPRAKTIKEN

and URBANCZYK, ZUR VERBANDSKLAGE IMiZIVILPROZESS

DURCH

VERBXNDE

(1981) (with an

exten-

sive bibliography, at xv-xxvii). These provisions are part of civil law, and therefore
not exactly analogous to a provision permitting environmental association lawsuits
under public law. This makes for important differences. Association suits under the
UG are authorized because in the absence of such authority, there would be no one
to safeguard the public interest. This rationale does not apply to the environmental
context, where the bureaucracy is already protecting the public interest as it sees it.
See Kloepfer, Rechlsschutz im Urnweltschutz, 76 VERWALTUNGS-ARCHI\' 371, 387 (1985).
Further, a business firm whose standard terms of contract may be challenged by a
consumer organization does not act on the basis of a governmental permit. The
firm's expectations are very different from those of the owner of, for example, a
nuclear power plant, who operates under a public license and must be able to rely on
that license even if, unbeknownst to him, it was granted "illegally." This, too, makes
an expansion of potential plaintiffs beyond those whose rights are at stake inadvisable. See F. WEYREu.rHER, supra note 24, at 45-54. Weyreuther discusses further reasons why the analogy between existing association lawsuits and the proposed
environmental right to sue may be misleading. Id. at 27, 29.
59. SKOURIS, VERLETZTENKLAGEN UND INTERESSENTENKLAGEN IM VERWALTUNGSPROZESs 55 (1979).
60. American courts no longer treat the "legal interest" test as a justiciability
requirement but as going to the merits. Ass'n of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). See
Connelly, supra note 5, at 141-42.
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The irregular structure of tripartite litigation entails restrictions
upon the availability and scope ofjudicial review. In contrast to plaintiffs in strictly adversarial proceedings, third-party plaintiffs have to substantiate their claims in order to be granted standing to sue. The scope
of judicial review is also narrower in third-party litigation than in cases
brought by addressee-parties who claim to be adversely affected. Courts
will not review the agency action in all its aspects, but only its compati6
bility with the protective norm the plaintiff invoked. '
Some provisions of environmental statutes fulfill the traditional
standards of protective norms, and they have been recognized as such
by thejudiciary. 62 As early as the mid-1950s, the Federal Administrative
Court admitted neighborhood suits in the context of industrial emissions; the court reaffirmed this position in a carefully worded opinion in
1967.63 Plaintiffs are granted standing if they are "neighbors" of the
beneficiary of administrative action, and if they can invoke a rule that
protects their interests. Nevertheless, even plaintiffs who live within the
"neighborhood" must establish an individual relationship between
themselves and the dangers allegedly emanating from a particular facility. 64 There must be some showing of potential individual damage; general objections to the use of nuclear energy, for example, do not confer
65
standing.
These doctrines are of limited effectiveness in lawsuits directed
against large construction projects requiring permits and licenses. The
way lawsuits against nuclear power plants are fought, argued, and
decided makes the presence of a nominal plaintiff all but superfluous.
Many lawsuits arising over licenses and permits for industrial facilities,
though private and individual in form, are defacto collective, public interest actions. 6 6 The nominal plaintiffs are normally found by citizen
groups and then presented to independent attorneys. Qualified individ61. E.g., BVerwG, 1969 DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 142 (case brought by a
private builder whose construction permit was revoked by a lower court in response
to a neighbor's complaint, while conceding that the permit was granted in violation
of statutory law. The Federal Administrative Court reinstituted the permit since the
violated norm did not "intend" the neighbor's protection).
62. BhnSchG § 5(1)(i) (which mentions the "neighborhood"); VGH Mannheim,
1974 DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 706; OVG Koblenz, 1975 GEWERBE-ARCHIV 165;
OVG Hamburg, 1975 DEutrscHES VERWALTUNGSBLA-r 207; OVG Muenster, 1976
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 2360.
63. 28 Bl'enwG 131 (1967). Cf BERGER, GRUNDFRAGEN UMWELTRECHTLICHER
NACHBARKLAGEN 36 (1982).
64. This condition does not apply where the individual relationship is obvious
because plaintiff lives in close proximity to the construction site. ALBERS, GERICHTSENTSCHEIDUNGEN zu KERNKRAFIVERKEN 17 (1980).
65. E.g., VG Schleswig, 1974 ENERGIEWIRTSCHAFrLICHE TAGESFRAGEN 445. Not
even a claim that a potentially catastrophic accident would endanger a plaintiff's
health is sufficiently individualized and substantial to confer standing. BI'entG, 1985
DEUTSCHES VERNVALTUNGSBLATT 401. Cf also notes 160-61 i'fra and accompanying
text.
66. Legal scholars refer to these actions as "regionally limited citizen suits"
(regionalbegremzte Popularklage). See Kloepfer, RechlsschutI: hi nmweltsclut:, 76 VERwAI.TUNGS-ARcHiv 371, 381 (1985).
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ual plaintiffs cannot be denied standing simply because they are backed
by organized groups. Indeed, in many cases, the plaintiffs do not matter
and are rarely consulted. Barring unusual occurrences, such as the
nominal plaintiff's death in the course of litigation, the judiciary's insisrights does not obstruct litigation
tence upon the veneer of 6private
7
against large-scale projects.
Under these circumstances, justiciability doctrines could easily have
collapsed under the weight of litigation. Trends in this direction
became visible in the mid-1970s. Perhaps under the impression that
large-scale construction projects would inevitably end up in court, some
judges began to accept cases arising from such projects as long as the
claims raised were not clearly without merit.6 8 Courts determined that
the "neighborhood" of an industrial facility is not merely its immediate
vicinity but the area in which a plant has a measurable effect, an area
which can extend for many miles. 69 At the same time, explicit reflections upon plaintiffs' duty to substantiate individual complaints became
comparatively rare in environmental litigation concerning large
projects. 70 Then, too, the courts displayed a strong tendency to equate
administrative regulations per se with subjective claims on the part of
third parties. Plaintiffs obtained standing under provisions without a
recognizable protective purpose, including some that state explicitly
that they serve to protect the public, language that typically precludes
third party standing. 7 ' At least some cases, especially in the environmental area but also in more traditional fields of administrative law, suggest that judicial control of the bureaucracy is no longer merely
67. In recent years, environmental organizations have also begun to buy small
patches of land near construction sites and in ecologically valuable areas. The orga-

nizations are then entitled to the same legal protection as any other property owner.
This technique of circumventing standing barriers is described by Neumeyer,
Erfahrungen mit der M'erbandsklage aus der Sicht der t'eraltungsgeriche, in WAHRNEHMIJNG
VON NATURSCHUTZINTERESSEN IN GERICHTLICHEN VERFAHREN 44, at 50-51 (Kopp ed.
1988).
68. Fischerhof, Ergebnisse der Rechtsprechung tieber die Genehmigung von Atomanlagen,
in DRIrrEs DEUTSCHES Atomrechtssymposium 19, 23 (Lukes ed. 1975) (duty to substantiate claims very low in nuclear power litigation).
69. E.g., OVG Liineburg, 1978 GEWERBE-ARCHiV 341, and 1980 GEWERBE-

ARCHV 206. These decisions concern nuclear facilities. "Neighborhood" under the
BImScdG is discussed thoroughly
INDUSTRIEANLAGEN (1988).

by

SELLNER,

IMMISSIONSSCHUTZRECHT

UND

70. In some cases, questions of admissability are not discussed at all.
71. E.g., AG § 7(2)(vi). Although the clause explicitly refers to public interests, at
least one court opined that it is protective and others did not want to exclude this
possibility. In 1982, the Federal Administrative Court answered this question in the

affirmative. Bl'enuG, 1982

DIE

OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG

820, 821.

BImSchG

§ 5(1)(ii) used to be a similarly embattled provision. Although the clause makes no
mention of third parties, some courts granted standing and relief under the provision. OVG Minster, 1976 DEurscHEs VERWALTUNGSBt.ATr 793; OVG fineburg,
1980 GENVERBE-ARCHIV 203 and 1981 GEWERBE ARCHny 34 1. Eventually. the Federal
Administrative Court ruled that BImSchG § 5(1)(ii) generally offers no protection to
third parties. 65 Bl'entGE 37, 42 (1984). These decisions are discussed by SELI.NER.
IMMISSIONSSCHUTZRECHT UND INDUSTRIEANI.AGEN 55-59 (2d ed. 1988).
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72
incidental to the protection of private rights.
The increased availability ofjudicial review led, quite predictably, to
an expansion of its scope. 7 3 Courts have undertaken comprehensive
examinations of reactor safety, including precautions against complete
melt-downs and explosions-issues far removed from the grounds on
which the plaintiffs obtained standing. 74 Doctrines limiting the scope of
judicial review of discretionary agency action have also partially
eroded. 75 Again, these developments are most pronounced in environuse litigation also show signs of
mental cases, but competitors' and7land
6
increased judicial interventionism.
To some extent, the trend towards public interest litigation under
the cover of private lawsuits and the concurrent erosion of restrictions
upon the availability and scope of judicial review resulted from the
application of traditional doctrines to a new, complex and technical subject-matter. For example, the geographical expansion of "neighborhood" was substantially justified, inasmuch as it sought to afford those
who suffer tangible losses, though not immediate neighbors of a facility,
the same remedies available to neighbors under traditional land use law.
But the concept did change in the process of geographical expansion.
In contrast to its restrictive function in land use law, it rarely serves to
limit the class of potential plaintiffs in environmental cases. 77 Similarly,
judicial efforts to limit the class of qualified plaintiffs forced the courts to
look at the substance of cases in the context of discussing their admissability. Through this backdoor, some plaintiffs obtained rulings on the
merits of cases they were not entitled to bring. 78 These and similar difficulties arising from the peculiar nature of large projects are an important reason why judicial review expanded most rapidly and spectacularly
in cases arising over nuclear reactors.
There are also indications, though, that the novel and intrinsically
difficult character of environmental cases does not fully explain the
expansion of the judicial function, and that the courts strayed from their
traditionally deferential stance to a more aggressive review of administrative fact-finding and decision-making. At least some courts, appar-

72. See BERGER, GRUNDFRAGEN UMWELTRECHLICHER NACHBARKLAGEN 153 (1982).
73. Id. at 169.
74. Cf examples discussed in Ossenbiihl, Die gerichtliclie L'beiprn'ifing der Beurleilung
Ieclischer and wirlschaftlicherFragen in Genehnigungen des Bans von Kernkraftwerken, 1978
DEUTScHES VERWALTUNGSBLATr 1, 2-4. This separation of the grounds on which
plaintiffs obtain standing from the subject-matter of litigation has, of course,
occurred in the United States as well. E.g., Duke Power v. North Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
75. This was noted as earlv' as 1974 in Ossenbiihl, Vorn unbestintinen Recltsbegriffzur
letztverbindlichen l'rn'altimtgsenIscheidung,1974 DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBI-ATr 309.
76. Burmeister, Die 'erbandsklage in vefassungsrechllicher Sichl, in RECHTSFRAGEN
DES GENEHMIGUNGSVERFAHRENS VON KERNKRAFTWERKEN 7, 11 (Boerner ed. 1978).
77. BERGER, GRUNDFRAGEN 1MWELTREHTLICHER NAcHBARKIAGE, 132 (1982) (lit-

igation against large projects not "typical neighborhood lawsuits").

78. Czajka, Wnhalt und

n'ifang der richlerlichen Kontrolle

i iechnischen Sicherheisrechl.

1981 ENERGIEWIRTSCIAI-rLICiE TAGESFRAGEN 537, 537-38.
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ently determined to offer the public maximum protection under existing
law, replaced the search for a legally protected interest with the search
for some actual effect that the challenged facility might have on the
plaintiff. The Court of Appeals in Liineburg, for example, attempted to
79
improve the safety of nuclear reactors in this fashion.
But whatever the motives and the precise extent of these doctrinal
shifts may have been, they can by no stretch of the imagination be interpreted as a general tendency towards collective, public interest forms of
litigation. The trends towards the acceptance of defacto public interest
cases and towards judicial control of administrative decision-making
even in the absence of clearly discernible individual rights has been partially reversed. Beginning in the early 1980s, the judiciary stopped the
expansion of private environmental rights and limited environmental litigants' access to court by imposing very substantial pleading requirements upon plaintiffs seeking to obtain standing.8 0 The Federal
Administrative Court ruled that substantial provisions of nuclear power
law and of the BImSchG, held to be "protective" by many lower courts,
served no such purpose. 8 ' The Federal Constitutional Court also
explained that the legislature's decision to promote nuclear power was
constitutionally permitted, and that the existing legal provisions sufficed
to protect the populace. 82 This decision proved extremely influential;
the administrative courts took it as a signal to further limit the scope of
83
individual legal protection in cases brought against nuclear reactors.
This judicial change of direction was relatively easy to accomplish
because even at the height ofjudicial assertiveness-during the second
half of the 1970s-the courts never revoked their basic commitment to
the principles of private rights litigation. Although lawsuits brought by
environmental groups would hardly differ from the present pattern of
litigation over large construction projects, the courts have upheld the
facade of adversarial, individual litigation. Citizen groups qua groups,
have never been granted standing to sue.8 4 There is still no general
79. E.g., OVG Lilneburg, 1980 GEWERBE-ARCHiv 203, and 1982 DETrrscHEs
The cases are discussed by BERGER, GRUNDFRAGEN

VERWALTUNGSBLATr 966.

UMWELTRECHTLICHER NACHBARKLAGEN 205

(1982).

80. See generally Eiberle-Herm, Tendenzen im veraltungsgericlillicdhe RechisschiliRechisschuzdefizile durch Kontrollve:icht, 15 DEMOKRATIE UND RECHT 264 (1987); and
Baumann, supra note 26, at 260-63.
81. 65 B~erwGE 313, 320 (1982) and 69 Bl'entwGE 37, 42 (1984) (BImSdhG
§ 5(1)(ii) not protective); 61 BI'ent'GE 256 (1981); .41G § 7(2)(iii). The latter decision
is discussed infa note 160-61 and accompanying text.
82. 49 BlefGE 89 (1978) ("Kalkar"). In another decision concerning the interpretation of the .tG, the Federal Constitutional Court greatly curtailed the scope of
judicial review in nuclear power licensing proceedings. 1986 DEUTSCHES VERW'ALTUNGSBLATr 190 ("Wyhl").
83. Baumann, supra note 26, at 261.
84. No group has ever been granted standing. In one case, an appellate court
denied poverty relief to an individual plaintiff against a nuclear power plant because
the plaintiff was used by the local environmental group in order to litigate at the
public's expense. VGH Baden-Wiirttemberg, 1974 ENERGIEWIRTSCIIIAFLICIIE
TAGESFRAGEN 259.
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judicial remedy against administrative lack of action or zeal, still no
standing to sue and, hence, no control over the bureaucracy in the
absence of a protective norm and a plausible private rights claim. German environmental litigation has remained almost exclusively limited to
private challenges to licenses for large industrial facilities under nuclear
and air pollution control law. 85 American environmental litigation, of
course, has gone far beyond such "NIMBY" (not-in-my-backyard) suits.
IV. Legislation
Although proposals for legislative authorizations of public interest litigation have accompanied the German debate about environmental law
and policy ever since the early 1970s, the reform has stopped short of
the more liberal American policy. 86 The reason is that the vindication of
public interests and control of administrative activity that does not
infringe upon individual rights are considered inherently public, political functions. Individuals must not be allowed to act in lieu of the state,
as they would if they were allowed to act as private attorneys general.
Most advocates of increased judicial control over the bureaucracy therefore argued that associations of individuals should be granted standing
to sue without invoking their own or even their members' rights. This
was a somewhat more plausible and promising proposal than individual
citizen standing because under German law, some associations (Verbenfide) are entrusted with certain public functions that could not be conferred upon individuals. 8 7 There is no a priori reason why the
vindication and control of the bureaucracy by means of litigation could
not fall into this category of public but transferable functions.
Nevertheless, a transfer of law enforcement authority to associations would constitute an exception to the individualistic principles
upon which German administrative law is based. As a general matter,
associations can challenge only those administrative actions that violate
its rights as an association. Restrictions of the constitutionally protected
freedom to associate and to assemble, for example, are contestable by
group litigants. 8 8 But associations cannot invoke others' rights in an
administrative lawsuit, 8 9 unless this opportunity is provided for by statu85. Kloepfer, Rechtsschutz im Oinweltschutz, 76 VERWALTUNGS-ARCHIv 371, 374

(1985).
86. FABER, DIE VERBANDSKLAGE IM VERWALTUNGSPROZESS 39-40 (1972). For a typical example of pronounced judicial distaste of the private attorney general cf. OVG
Liineburg, 1970 NEUEJURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 773.
87. Cf generally LESSMAN, DIE OFFENTLICHEN AUFGABEN UND FUNKTIONEN PRIVATRECHTLICHER WIRTSCHAFTSVERBXNDE

(1976).

88. The Basic Law protects the right to associate. GRUNDGESETZ, art. 9, § 1.
However, the Federal Constitutional Court has held consistently that Article 9 does
not convert an association's (factual) interests into legally recognized rights but presupposes the latter. E.g., 16 BI'eifGE 147, 158 (1963).
89. Collectives can be sued and sue on behalf of others under civil law but not
under administrative law. Further, there are three exceptions to the general prohibition on collective litigation under administrative law. First, collective legal entities
(such as business corporations) that possess a correlate of strictly individual, private
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tory law. "Others" means not only third parties or the public at large,
but also an association's members. In contrast to American law, which
90
permits groups to sue on behalf of their members, German administrative law is based upon the premise that the interests of association
members are different from the association's own interests. 9 1 For example, an environmental organization cannot claim that a nuclear power
plant endangers the lives of the group's members and thus its existence
as a group. 9 2 If members of a group think an administrative action has
93
Associaviolated their rights, they have to bring a suit on their own.
as any individual, but they possess no
rights
tions thus possess the same
94
special litigation rights.
Nevertheless, the legislature can make, and occasionally has made,
95
exceptions to the general prohibition on public interest lawsuits.
While conceding that such authorizations of association lawsuits were
rare and limited in scope, advocates of public interest litigation argued
area
that an expansion of collective litigation into the environmental
96
would not constitute a radical break with the legal tradition.
The most serious legislative attempt to institutionalize group standing rights in the environmental area was made during the debates over a
federal nature protection statute.9 7 Environmentalists concentrated
their efforts on this statute because the subject-matter made it very hard
to find plaintiffs who could obtain standing under the "protective
norms" and "neighborhood" tests. In contrast to statutes regulating
the construction of nuclear reactors and industrial facilities, a law protecting forests, plants, and wildlife hardly ever creates qualified plaintiffs. Environmentalists offered the restriction of group standing to the
BNatSchG as a concession to critics who warned that the political effects
rights are treated like individuals. FABER, supra note 86, at 39-40. Second, collective
litigation is permitted in certain real enforcement proceedings over property rights:
REDEKER & VON OERTZEN, KOMMENTAR ZUR VERWVALTUNGSGERICHTSORDNUNG

§

42

(8th ed. 1985). Third, VwGO § 42(2) enables the legislature to make statutory excep-

tions to individual standing requirements. See supra notes 24-25, 57-58 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1971) ("It is clear that an

organization whose members are injured may represent those members in a proceeding for judicial review"). The requirements for "associational standing"-which,
compared to German doctrines, are very lax-are stated most clearly in Hunt %.
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Cf International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 281-82 (1985).
91. FABER, supra note 86, at 22.

92. The Federal Constitutional Court denied standing. Bl'elfG, 1981

NEtE JtRI-

362.
93. A typical judicial application of this approach is VGH Mannheim, 1972 NEVE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 1101. An association of private citizens had challenged
STISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT

the application of a zoning ordinance. The court denied standing, on the grotnds
that the organization invoked not its ovn rights but those of its members.

94. F.

WEYREUTHER,

supra note 24, at 4.

95. Supra notes 24-25, 57-58 and accompanying text.
96. E.g., MEYER-TAscH, UMWELTRECHT IM WANDEL 72-77, 84 (1978).

97. Bundesnaturschutzgesetz [hereinafter B.VatSciG].
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group right to sue were unpredictable and
of a general environmental
98
potentially disastrous.
The BNatSchG turned out to be a far cry from what environmentalists had lobbied for. Section 29(1) grants certain environmental protection groups a right to participate in administrative proceedings, unless
another statute provides for an identical or a broader form of participation. This right, however, is subject to restrictions. Environmental
groups desiring to participate have to be licensed by the bureaucracy.
In order to obtain a license, an association has to show, inter alia, that it
furthers, on a permanent basis, the protection of natural resources; that
it is organized on a regional or national, not merely a local, basis; and
that it can guarantee an adequate performance of its tasks. 9 9 Moreover,
and more important, the right to participate does not entail a right to
challenge the resulting agency decision in court; the Bundestag explicitly rejected the idea of public interest litigation when debating the
00
statute.1
Environmentalists reached somewhat more favorable results at the
state level. Section 42(2) VwGO and section 29(1) BNatSchG leave it
open to the states to adopt more extensive agency and judicial procedures than are available under federal law. Five states (Bremen,
Hamburg, Berlin, Hesse, and Saarland) have decided to allow environmental groups to challenge administrative actions without invoking private rights. In all five states, participation in agency proceedings and
bureaucratic licensing are necessary to obtain standing. Federal laws
and federal agency actions cannot be challenged by groups, and all five
states have restricted group litigation to cases arising under their nature
protection statutes.
Although these provisions for collective litigation are very limited in
scope, and have been used only infrequently,' 0 1 they have provoked
expressions of pronounced judicial distaste for group litigation: in several decisions, appellate courts read the relevant provisions as narrowly
as the statutory language would allow. The most restrictive decisions,
issued under Hesse's statute, became part of the battle against a projected runway at the Frankfurt airport, one of the most intense fights
over a construction project West Germany has seen. The plan for the
02
runway was issued amidst heated controversy and public resistance.1
The bureaucracy, complying with statutory requirements, allowed a
licensed citizens group to participate in the administrative planning process. In the course of construction, though, the bureaucracy failed to
take care of some details of water distribution and of several changes in
98. See infa notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
99. B.VatSrhG § 29(1)-(2).
100. Rehbinder, Argunente fii" die 1'erbandsklage im Unweltrecht, 1976 ZEITSCHRIFr
FOR RECEITSPOLITIK 157, 158.
101. P. NEUMEYER, supra note 26, at 44-49.
102. The account of the facts is taken from Rehbinder, Die hessische I'erbandsklageaif
dew Prifstandder Ier,atitgsgerichlsbarkeit, 1982 NEUE ZErITSCHRIFr FOR VERWAI.TUNGSRECHT 666, 667.
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the plans for local facilities. Instead of regulating these matters in a
planning proceeding, which would have mandated interest group participation, the agency followed an informal procedure that did not require
intervenors to be heard. A licensed citizen group challenged the resulting decision in court, arguing that it had been illegally excluded from
the proceedings.
The group won in trial court, but in a very restrictive opinion, the
Court of Appeals reversed,' 0 3 on the theory that since group participation in agency proceedings was not a prerequisite for the validity of
administrative action, the plaintiff-group could not enforce participation
through the judiciary. The court further held that the group had no
standing to raise the question of whether the agency had illegally evaded
a procedure with higher participation requirements. Hesse's statute
explicitly provides for public interest litigation against decisions and
omissions affecting the environment, but it also requires that a group
challenging administrative action must have participated in the administrative decision-making process to be entitled to sue. Where there is no
participation, the court held, there can be no interest group standing to
sue the agency for its refusal to adopt formal procedures. Under this
approach, even licensed citizen groups cannot object to an agency's illegal evasion of formal procedures. Nor can they sue an agency for complete inaction.
The appellate court's opinion was the first of a line of cases that
severely limited interest group standing under statutory law.10 4 In fact,
the courts have dismissed every lawsuit brought by environmental
associations under the Hesse statute as inadmissible, occasionally on the
basis of questionable interpretations of the pertinent provisions.' 0 5 Not
surprisingly, thejudiciary's reluctance to even admit association lawsuits
has discouraged environmental organizations from bringing further
suits.10 1 Berlin's authorization of group litigation has also been subject
10 7
to a very narrow judicial interpretation, albeit for different reasons.
103. VGH Kassel, 1982

NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERNVALTUNGSRECHT 689.
104. Rehbinder, Die hessische erbandsklage aitf dent Priffstand der l'envallungsgeridsbarkeit, 1982 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR VERVALTUNGSRECHT 666, 667-68.
105. Cf the very harsh criticism by Sening, Zur 1'erbandsklage im Hessisrhen .Var-

sdhnlzgesetz, 1983 NATUR UND RECHT 146; Rehbinder, supra note 102; Neumeyer, supra
note 26, at 49-50.
106. NEUMEYER, supra note 26, at 49-50.
107. In an effort to make association lawsuits compatible with the principles of
individual legal protection, the Berlin legislature permitted group litigation only
when no individual plaintiff existed. Berliner Naturschutzgesetz § 39(a) [hereinafter
BlnNatSchG]. The appellate administrative court in Berlin considered this arrangement too unclear to be compatible with the constitutional principles of the rule of
law, and declared it null and void. OVG Berlin, 1986 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR VERWAI.TUNGSRECHT 318. Subsequently, the Federal Administrative Court held the provision
constitutional, but ruled that association lawsuits are precluded if anyone who has
been heard in the administrative proceedings had (or would have) standing to ste,
even if no one did in fact bring suit. 1988 DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBL-Tr 492. 494.
This narrow reading was held to be a faithful implementation of the legislature intent
to permit "only a very limited association right to sue.- Id. at 495.
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Very few suits have been brought under the Hamburg, Bremen, and
Saarland statutes. On the whole, then, the existing provisions for environmental association lawsuits have fallen far short of effecting a transformation of the legal system.
Nor is it likely that the federal legislature will broaden environmental groups access to courts. Although environmental organizations, the
Greens, and many SPD leaders have sustained their demands for public
interest litigation, chances that such reforms will be passed are slim. In
1978, the government publicly expressed its regrets over the defeat of
group standing rights in the BiatSchG, and proposed to introduce it into
amendments to a statute regulating the construction of nuclear power
plants, which were then under consideration.1 0 8 This attempt failed, as
did all others. Before the 1983 elections, a planned revision of the
BXatSciG died amidst sharp controversy over a provision for interest
group standing advocated by the SPD/FDP government.' 0 9 Despite the
opposition's and environmentalists' clamor and although election day
was near, the liberal-conservative government did not include group
rights in its most recent proposals to amend the BNatSchG.110
A second set of proposals to expand environmental rights and the
judiciary's role in environmental protection has revolved around the
constitutionalization of private claims to a clean and healthy environment. Although this idea has been debated and advocated less intensely
than proposals for statutory public interest litigation, it has been a standard component of the environmental debate over the past fifteen years.
Several legal scholars argue the existence of a constitutional right to a
clean and healthy environment in the penumbras of the Basic Law. I II
Then Chancellor Brandt alluded to a "right" to environmental protection in his 1973 governmental address, albeit without actually mentioning the Basic Law. The political party most strongly committed to such
a right was the FDP. On various occasions, then-FDP Chairman and
Minister for Domestic Affairs, Hans Dietrich Genscher, postulated a
1
right to "undisturbed sleep, clean water, and pure air." 12
108. Bundesministerium des Inneren, Umwelt No. 2, at 2 (1978).
109. Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Press and Information
Office of the Federal Government) (W. Ger.), Bulletin No. 107 (Nov. 11, 1982).
110. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nov. 7, 1986. The use environmental
groups tried to make of their standing rights in the Frankfurt airport controversy may
well have contributed to mounting political opposition to statutory authorizations of
environmental group litigation. Rehbinder, Die hessische 1erbandsklageatif den Prffstand
der l'env(,altungsgeridhlsbarkeit, 1982 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERVALTUNGSRECHT 666.
667.
11I.However, they are a decided minority. See generally von Miinch. 1 GRUNDGEsETz-Ko MMENTAR, 148 (art. 2, no. 61) (3d ed. 1985). A concise summary of arguments against a right to a clean environment can be found in Rauschning,
Staalsaitfgabe 0'ineliscnt:,38 VEROFFENTLICHUNGEN DES VERBANDS DEUTSCHER ST.ATSRECITSLETHRER 168, 178-79 (1979). A recent comprehensive discussion of proposals
to constitutionalize environmental protection is MICHEL., STAATSZWECKE. STAATSZIEI.E
UNI) GRUNDRECHTSINTERPRETATIONEN (1986).
112. E.g., Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Press and Information Office of the Federal Government) (W. Ger.), Bulletin No. 34 (March 28, 1973).
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The debate about a constitutional right to a clean environment has
been refuelled by the Greens' victories in state and federal elections,
and by widespread public concern over the degradation of the German
forests (lT'aldsterben), commonly believed to be the result of acid rain.
The Greens have submitted to the federal legislature a proposal for a
constitutional amendment guaranteeing a basic environmental right.' 13
But legal scholars are almost uniformly opposed to the recognition of an
environmental right in the Basic Law,' 14 and there is insufficient political sentiment to make a federal constitutional right to a clean environment a realistic possibility. State governments have also refused to add
a private, litigable right to a clean environment to their state
constitutions.
Even if the federal government recognized a constitutional environmental right, this would not necessarily lead to successful collective litigation. In all likelihood, courts would construe a constitutional right to
a clean environment as an individual right, and still require plaintiffs to
substantiate their individual claims. Since it is extremely hard to see
how demands for public goods such as clean air could be made individual, and thus be distinguishable from a generalized demand for a more
aggressive environmental policy, an individual environmental right
would still not bring about public interest litigation. The Bavarian constitution does contain a private right to "enjoy nature," ' 1 5- but collective
claims have been almost as ill-fated in Bavaria as in any other state. A
court of appeals has held that environmental organizations cannot sue
under the provision.' 1 6 Furthermore, an environmental right could, at
most, be a negative, defensive right; it would not likely entitle private
parties to affirmative governmental action, such as more extensive environmental legislation. 17 For these reasons, environmentalists and lawyers sympathetic to their cause have generally recognized that the effects
113. Bundestag Drucksache 10/990 (1984).
114. In a 1987 hearing before the Bundestag Committee on Legal Affairs, for
example, legal experts representing a broad spectrum of political opinions opposed
the idea of a justiciable environmental right in the Basic Law. Bericht, 1988 NATUR
UND RECHT 80, 81. Cf note 11 supra and accompanying text.
115. Bavarian Constitution, art. 143, § 3.
116. BayVGH, 1975 DEUrSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLA-r 665. This decision is somewhat at odds, though, with two previous decisions by the same court: 1973 BAYERISCHE VERWALTUNGSBLXTrER 211, and 1974 BAYERISCHE VERWALTUNGSBLXTrER 545.
117. KLOEPFER, ZUM GRUNDRECHT AUF UMWELTSCHUTZ 27-28 (1978) (with regard
to a basic environmental right in the "penumbras" of the Basic Law). The situation
would be no different if an explicit environmental right were inserted into the Basic
Law. Even with regard to the enforcement of existing statutes, a constitutional right
to a clean environment may be of limited effectiveness. No constitutional right
entails a further, general right to have the law enforced. Such a claim would elevate
the courts to an instrument of total control over public administration, an idea that is
alien to the Basic Law. MAUNZ & DORIG, GRUNDGESETZ-KoMMENTAR, art. 19(4). no.
122 (1985).
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of a constitutional environmental right would probably be limited.' 18
Another way of constitutionalizing environmental protection would
be to add such a right to the "goals of state" mentioned in the Basic
Law-for example, in article 6(1) and, most prominently, in Article
20. 119 A constitutional statement of intent would be even less effective
than an environmental "right"; the goals enumerated in articles 6 and
20 obligate the state to act in ways conducive to those ends, but they are
not rights and thus not directly justiciable. Still, a constitutional statement of intent might influence judicial interpretations of particular statutes. It might also increase the extent to which environmental values
have to be considered in complex administrative planning decisions,
such as zoning ordinances. Conceivably, it could also lead to an expan20
sion of standing to sue.'
Many states have considered adding such a statement of intent to
12 2
Several
their constitutions, 12 1 and Bavaria has actually done so.
states have urged the federal government to change the Basic Law
accordingly, and the SPD opposition (in the Bundestag) as well as the
government (through the Bundesrat) have submitted bills to this
effect.' 23 Under pressure from the FDP, and in order to demonstrate
their commitment to environmental protection, the Christian Democrats
have endorsed an environmental "goal of state," at least in principle.
But the constitutional amendment proposed by the government is very
narrowly drawn, so as to prevent any possibility of judicial interpretations that might force the legislature to toughen or amend environmental statutes. 124 The amendment is thus too limited to be accepted by the
opposition parties, and therefore in serious danger of failing to muster
the necessary two-thirds majority. On the other hand, any statement of
118. E.g., MEYER-TASCH, UMWELTRECHT IM WANDEL 17 n.16 (basic environmental
right would have "merely propagandistic value"); and REHBINDER, supra note 37, at
117 (positive environmental right would not necessarily lead to collective litigation).
119. Art. 6(1) provides that "[m]arriage and the family are under the special protection of the state (slaatlichen Ordiung)." Art. 20 contains four principles of govern-

ance: democracy and popular sovereignty; federalism; the rule of law (Rechisstaal);
and, somewhat more nebulously, a "social state" (Sozialstaat).
120. See Kloepfer, L'mweltschutz und Tefassungsrecht, 1988 DEUTSCHES VER.ALTUNGSBLATr 305, 316. The author correctly stresses, that the consequences of a constitutional statement of intent (or for that matter, of a basic environmental right) are

very hard to anticipate. An attempt to do so-and a very negative assessment of the
constitutionalization of environmental values-is Michel, Umw'ellschui- als Staats:iel?,
1988 NATUR UND REcHT 272.
121. These are Schleswig-Holstein and Saarland (Das Parlament March 17, 1984),
Bremen (Die Welt, July 10, 1984), and Rheinland-Pfalz (Frankfurter Rundschau, May
15, 1984).
122. Frankfurter Rundschau, 6 April 1984.
123. Bericht, 1988 NATUR UND RECHT 80. Again, the tenor of scholarly opinion concerning a constitutional statement of environmental intent has been "predominantly
skeptical." Id. at 82.
124. The Bundesrat proposal (which represents the government's ideas concerning
a statement of intent) contains a "balancing clause," which would permit legislatures
to balance environmental values against other governmental goals and objectives. 11
Bundeslag Drucksache 885.
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intent acceptable to the CDU/CSU would fail to strengthen the hands of
individual environmental plaintiffs, to say nothing of instigating public
interest litigation.
V. The Reformation That Did Not Happen
German administrative law has not remained entirely untouched by
attempts to legitimize public interest litigation in theory and to institute
it in practice. Citizen groups play more of a role in litigation now than
they did twenty years ago. The judiciary's understanding of private
rights has become quite broad in the environmental area. '2 5 Traditional, highly individualistic doctrines have been stretched or diluted.
Distinctions between private rights and public policies, between the
judiciary's task to protect private rights and the bureaucracy's task to
determine the public interest, have become less rigorous and clear26

cut. 1

German legal scholars have criticized these developments, often in
very harsh terms, as a "perversion" of the existing system of individual
legal protection. 127 By comparison with the United States, however, the
trends in the direction of greater collective interest representation that
have occurred in the Federal Republic appear very modest. The American legal system accommodates "non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs"-plaintiffs
who assert no private rights but only "public interests"-and public (as
opposed to private) actions. 12 8 It systematically strengthens the hand of
public interest constituencies in the administrative process. The vindication of public interests is not merely incidental to the protection of
rights in the process of judicial review of administrative action; it is the
very purpose of judicial oversight. Collective interests and "concerned
citizens" act as "private attorneys general," supplementing governmen29
tal law enforcement.'
These doctrines and practices-constitutive elements of the reformation of administrative law-have been rejected by the Federal Republic. Despite public interest litigation under the cover of private lawsuits
and the concurrent dilution of legal doctrines, German administrative
law has shown a remarkable stability. "Big" environmental cases did not
cause the entire doctrinal system to explode. Although current German
civil law offers a few opportunities for collective interest representation
125.

BERGER, GRUNDFRAGEN UMWELTRECHTLICHER NACHBARKLAGEN 155 (1982).
DEGENHART, KERNENERGIERECHlT: SCHIWERPUNKTE. ENTSCHEIDIDTNGS-

126. E.g.,

STRUKTUREN, ENTWICKLUNGSLINIEN

nuclear power litigation to equate
third-party claims).

177-78 (1981) (increased judicial tendency in
with subjective

administrative regulations per se

127. Cf infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
128. The concept of "public actions" is defined and discussed by I..J.FFE,J1tDIcIA.L
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIV-E AcTION. ch. 12 (1965).

129. See. e.g., Boyer & Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatopy Enforcement. 34 BUF.ALO ..
REV. 833, 836 (1985). The West German legal system has seen some modest expan-

sion of private actions, but they are still, unquestionably, private remedies for private
wrongs. In citizen suits, there is no attempt to define or remedy a private wrong.
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in court, these continue to be recognized as extremely limited exceptions, and have no "spillover effects" into administrative law. The legal
system is still oriented towards protecting private rights, not towards the
vindication of collective interests. Judicial control of bureaucracy is still
incidental to the protection of private rights. The private attorney general is still viewed with profound suspicion. Organized interests can still
use the courts only within the context of individual, private rights.
The Federal Republic of Germany is not the only country whose
recent legal history casts doubt on the assertion that the United States is
leading a worldwide trend towards collective interest representation in
the legal process. England and Canada, for example, also appear to
have made only marginal adjustments towards accommodating collective interests in the legal process. They also have failed to accept the
propositions upon which public interest litigation in the United States is
built. 130 What is remarkable about the Federal Republic is how decisively and conclusively the option of collective, public interest litigation
in environmental law was rejected. Environmental protection was the
policy arena where public interest litigation was most vocally demanded,
where the arguments for it seemed most persuasive, and where, due to
widespread and intense public concern, its advocates found the most
favorable political climate. Environmental public interest litigation
could eventually have affected all areas of environmental administrative
decision-making. 13' Even if public interest litigation had been limited
to a few statutes, a precedent for the collective legal representation of
important social interests would have been created. In short, environmental law, and only environmental law, offered an opportunity for a
reformation of German administrative law.
That opportunity has passed. The debate about statutory public
interest litigation, which dominated the literature on environmental law
reform during much of the 197 0s, is largely settled. 13 2 The arguments
for and against association lawsuits have been known for a decade. I' : A
few legal scholars have continued to press for collective litigation,13 4 but
neither they nor their far more numerous opponents have shown much
130. SeeJacob, Access to Justice in England, in THE REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURAL LmA
AND OTHER EssAYs IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 166 (J.Jacob ed. 1982). With regard to Can-

ada cf. Bryden, supra note 13.
131. F. WEYREUTHER, supra note 24, at 40.
132. Kloepfer, Rechtsschulz: im Umweltsrhut:, 76 VERWALTUNGS-ARCHIV 371, 386
(1985).
133. Breuer, IIirksanierer Limweltschuiz durch Reforii des ent'altngsz'eifahrens- nnd
'erualtungsprozessreclits?, 1978 NEUEJURISTISCHE WOCENsCHRir 1558, 1560 ("New

arguments are hardly to be expected").
134. E.g., Langer, Der lIensch hn 17nmwellrechl, Pldedoerfir ein kollektives

n'mweltrecht,

1986 NATUR UND RECHT 270 (1986); GASSNER, TREUHANDK-AGE ZtGL'NSTEN vOx
NATUR UND LANDSCHAFr (1984). Gassner's book is the only contribution that does

not simply rehash arguments that have been made (and rejected) since the early
1970s.
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readiness for compromise. 13 5 Overwhelmingly, the legal profession has
maintained its position that public interest lawsuits in the environmental
area would unnecessarily undermine the foundations of the existing system of administrative law. 136 Political opposition towards group litigation has intensified, and the prospects for statutory authorizations of
collective litigation are much worse now than in the 1970s. The defeat
of collective interest representation in environmental disputes makes it
extremely unlikely that the Federal Republic will, in the near future,
institutionalize public interest litigation to any significant extent.
The reformation that did not happen was not a victim of disadvantageous political circumstances. To the contrary, the political and legal
climate was quite favorable to the proponents of group litigation during
the 1970s. For the entire decade, West Germany was governed by an
SPD/FDP coalition that had made the reform of outdated and anti-democratic legal structures, doctrines, and statutes a centerpiece of its political agenda. At the same time, political institutions came under severe
pressure to facilitate access to the courts, as this strategy held the promise of pacifying an increasingly militant environmental movement. 137
Popular unrest and resistance to nuclear power plants were often diffused by judicial decisions, even "negative" ones. Environmentalists
argued that the refusal to heed their call for expanded standing rights
had contributed to the protest movement.' 38 Representatives of citizen
groups warned that the state should not "force" citizens into permanent
opposition by denying them "basic rights."' 139 Hesse was the first state
to introduce interest group standing in environmental litigation because
the long controversy over the Frankfurt airport runway had unnerved
local and state politicians. Dumping political responsibility for controversial policies on the courts must have seemed an equally tempting
option elsewhere; governors were in considerable trouble, and at least
one of them (the Mayor of Hamburg) stumbled over resistance to
nuclear power. At a time when Green Party delegates were beginning to
win seats in local and state assemblies, it would have been natural for
legislators to focus environmentalists' attention on litigation.
At the same time, the federal legislature engaged in what has been
called a "hectic legislative ecstasy of action"' 140 on environmental matters. It passed acts regulating industrial emissions; waste removal; the
protection of animals, plants, and forests; clean water; hazardous chemi135. See Skouris, Uber die I'erbandsklage im t'enivalungsprozess, 1982 JItRISTIScIIE
(1982).
136. Kloepfer, Rechisschut ini Unweltsc/ut:, 76 VERWVALTUNGs-ARCI11V 371, 386-87
(1985); Burmeister, Die 1erbandsklage in verfassungsrechilicher Sichl. in RECIrTSFRAGEN
DES GENEHMIGUNGSVERFAIIRENS VON KERNKRAFTWERKEN 8 (Boerner ed.) (1978).
137. Bender, Einige rechspolitische Bemerkwngen zur t'erbandsklageint 6efntlichen Re/irl.
1976 DIE 6FFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 584, 585 (suggesting that collective litigation
SCHULUNG 100, 101

can and should be used to pacify environmental citizen groups).

138. MAYER-TAsCH, DIE BiORGERINITIATIVBEWEGtING 49 (4th ed., 1981).
139. Wuestenhagen, in CONTRA UND PRO VI:RBANDSKRIAGE 58 (1976).
140. MEYER-TAscii, UMWELtrRECIIT INMWANDEL 11 (1978).
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cals; air traffic noise; and several other matters. 14 1 Provisions for environmental protection were added to various administrative statutes; as
well as to the criminal and civil codes. 142 Given the hectic pace of legislation and the highly emotional political climate, the Bundestag might
well have passed proposals for environmental public interest litigationan idea that was widely portrayed and perceived as "pro-environment"
and "pro-democratic."
As for the courts, they had more than one excuse to expand private
rights and standing to sue to a much greater extent. The strictures of
protective norms, neighborhood, and claim substantiation did not effectively prevent citizen groups from bringing cases against licenses for
nuclear power plants and other industrial facilities, even though such
lawsuits always had to be couched in the language of individual rights as
they were commonly and traditionally understood. At least in the environmental context, a move towards less formalistic and individualistic
justiciability doctrines might thus have appeared not as a revolution but
as a natural adaptation of the legal system to more complex technologies and social realities.1 4 3 Finally, the expectation of increased political
popularity could have easily tempted judges to expand the scope ofjudicial review, and to admit political constituencies into court. 14 4 In contrast to legal scholars, the public viewed even the judges' more
adventurous forays into the jungle of nuclear reactor safety policy as
legitimate, and a vocal constituency of citizen activists and environmentalists demanded the judiciary's help.
To an extent, the judicial and legislative hostility towards public
interest litigation is explained by pragmatic considerations and political
partisanship. The judiciary's reluctance to facilitate court access was
caused in part by the experience of defacto public interest litigation over
nuclear power plants, a scenario which did little to spark the courts'
enthusiasm. The sheer size of these lawsuits creates difficulties; plaintiffs in cases against nuclear power plants may number in the hundreds
of thousands, and controversies over airports, highways and similar
projects are equally difficult to handle. 14 5 The cases demanded more
expertise than the courts could marshal, and more time than an already
overburdened administrative judiciary could afford. Legal recognition
141. The statutes are compiled in H. STEIGER, THE LXV AND PRACTICE REi.ATING
FRG xix-xxiii (1976).
142. The addition to the penal code is a section entitled "Criminal Actions Against
the Environment," Shrafgeselzbulc, §§ 324-30. New civil law provisions include the

TO POLLuTION CONTROL IN THE

Bitigeriches Geselzbuch, §§ 862, 906-07.
143. Some legal scholars suggested that a judicial recognition of citizen standing
would be no more than an adaptation to the social realities created by pervasive pollution. MEYER-TAsCH, supra note 140, at 72. Along similar lines, the courts have
been urged to rid administrative law of the "fraud" of public interest lawsuits under
the guise of individual litigation. Rehbinder, .itgtmenle fiter die Verbanidsklage hn
Umu'eltredlt, 1976 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR RECIHTSPOLITIK 157, 159 (1976).
144. Kloepfer, Rectlsschut: hit meltiscttz, 76 VERWALTUNGS-ARCIIIV 371. 375

(1985).
145. Cf supra note 48.
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of interest groups would only complicate matters. It is very much an
open question which and how many interest groups should be admitted,
what precisely their function would be, and whether their claims would
preclude claims brought by individual private parties.' 4 6 The current
law allows courts to sidestep these intricate issues.
Furthermore, the judges drew severe political and scholarly criticism for the role they played in environmental protection, and in particular for their activist approach to nuclear power cases. Throughout the
1970s and much of the 1980s, all major parties-the Christian Democrats, the SPD, and the FDP-remained firmly committed to the peaceful
use of nuclear energy. Judicial review delayed the construction of reactors by years and threatened to derail a governmental energy program
based on the extensive use of nuclear power. Not surprisingly, then,
protracted litigation did not incline the legislature towards expanding
litigation rights. Since the mid-1970s, there have been governmental
attempts to curtail access to court, not exclusively but primarily in environmental cases over large construction projects. Even when the
Bundestag expanded participation requirements, as it did under the
BNatSchG, it made clear that such provisions did not entail the participants' right to challenge the resulting decision in court. 14 7 Further, the
federal government seriously considered the possibility of constructing
nuclear reactors under legislative, rather than administrative permits, so
as to immunize nuclear reactors against judicial challenges. 148 The
Chancellor and some cabinet members advocated this idea, and some
state legislatures moved in the direction of greater legislative control
over the licensing process. 14 9 The proposal to build reactors by legislative enactment, which may have been unconstitutional,'15 0 did not come
t6 pass, largely because increased regulation and a growing body of case
law had already made the licensing process more predictable. 15 1 But
the legislature did pass a law providing that administrative decisions
concerning the construction and operation of large industrial facilities,
such as nuclear reactors, incinerators, highways, and airports could no
longer be appealed in administrative trial courts but must be taken
146. This problem was the source of the dispute over association lawsuits under
the BhiXatSchG, supra note 107.
147. With regard to the BAatSchG, cf. supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
In the case of the Federal Construction Law (which regulates land use and therefore
is of very considerable importance to environmental plaintiffs), the legislature drastically curtailed judicial review of procedural mistakes. See Baugesei-buch §§ 214-15
[hereinafter BauGB] (formerly Bundesbaugesel: §§ 155(a) & (b) [hereinafter BBauG]).
148. MEYER-TASCH, supra note 118, at 136-37.
149. Bliimel, Die Standorlvorsorgeplanuiigfir
f Kernkrafiwerke und andere uimweltrelevante
Grolforhaben in der BRD, 1977 DEUTSCHES VERWALTIINGSBLrr 301 (1977).

150. See Rengeling, "mwneltschut: hn I 'ert,altitngs'erfahrens-und Ie)-iialttngsprozes.echt.
1978 JURISTEN ZEITUNG 453, 455. The most extensive discussion of the legislature's
role in nuclear law and policy is in L6FFLER, DER PARLAMENTSVORBEIIA.T 1t
KERNENERGIERECHT (1985).
151. Ipsen, Die Genehmigung technischer Grolfanlagen, 107 ARcHlV DES oFFENrmicilEN
RECHTS 259, 260 (1982).
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directly to administrative appellate courts.1 52 By eliminating one level
of judicial review, this provision simplifies and accelerates the licensing
process of nuclear reactors and other facilities.
These, and other less drastic reforms, were generally supported by
what Germans commonly call the "dominant opinion" (herrschende
Meinuneg)-that is the majority of legal experts. Although a handful of
commentators, particularly those convinced of the life-threatening quality of even the safest reactor, have criticized the existing framework of
legal protection as woefully inadequate,' 5 3 the mainstream of scholarly
opinion has consisted largely of arguments that the courts had "perverted" the rule of law' 54 and transformed the system of individual
rights "practically beyond recognition."' 5 5 The harshest scholarly criticisms were directed against the judiciary's role in nuclear power litigation: the courts' willingness to engage in detailed examinations of
reactor safety was widely perceived as politically motivated.1 56
Concerns over a "politicized judiciary" had been voiced before in
the Federal Republic, but the developments in environmental litigation
during the 1970s gave the debate a new impulse and a new twist. For
the first time, criticism focused not on the Constitutional Court but on
the administrative judiciary.' 5 7 Articles in the legal literature began to
58
refer to judges as "investment brakes" and "censors of civilization."
At least in part, these accusations reflected not doctrinal, theoretical
concerns but a generally favorable attitude towards nuclear power and
industrial development on the part of a majority of the legal
152. Gesetz zur Entlastung des Gerichts in der Verwaltnngs- und Finanzgerichits-

barkeit, § 2(9) (Law for the Relief of the Court in the Administrative and Financial
Judiciary) [hereinafter Entlastungsgesetz].
153. E.g., Bosselmann, Rechisschutz ? Vein, Danke. Anmerkungen :za .AKIl-SIade- Yuteil
des Bundesve-i,altungsgeridhts, 14 KRITISCHE JUsTIz 402 (1982); Eiblerle-Herm. supra
note 80; and essays in RECHT UND TECHNIK IM SPANNTNGSFELD DER ENERGIEKONTROvERSE (Rossnagel ed. 1984).
154. Neumann, Uferlose e'etraltuinigsgerielsbarkeit-derzurn Richterstaat pen'erlierte
Rechissiaat, in AUF DEM WEG zu,-i RiCHTERSTAAT 152 (Kaltenbrunner ed. 1979).
155. Ossenbiihl, Aktuelle Problewe der Ge'altenteitng, 1980 DIE 6FFENTLICHE
VERWALTUNG 545, 548. A 1982 article by a proponent of extensive judicial review

contains a long list of scholarly arguments and invectives against the administrative

judiciary's approach to environmental cases. Baumann, supra note 26, at 257-58.
Despite thejudiciary's more deferential stance in recent year, scholarly criticism has

not become much more restrained. Cf. e.g., Piittner, Handhngsspieh'unie der I ent'alttng und Kontrolldichte geriehtlichen Rechissehutzes, in DIE OFFENTI.ICHEJERWALTUNG ZWISCHEN GESETZGEBUNG UND RiCHTERLICHER KONTROLLE 131 (Goetz ed. 1985).

156. Fairly typical examples of the tenor of scholarly criticism and comment
include Ossenbiihl, Die gerietiliche Ubeiprnfung der Benrleihtng technischer und wirsehaftlicher Fragen in Genelnigungen des Baus von Kernkrafiwerken, 1978 DEUTSCHES VERWMALTUNGSBLATr

1; DEGENHART, KERNENERGIERECHT:

SCHWERPITNKTE, ENTSCHEIDLTNGS-

STRUETUREN, ENrwicKLUNGSLINIEN (1981). See also itfra note 158.

157.

PAPIER,

DIE STELLUNG

DER VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT

IM

DEMOKR.VTI-

SCHEN RECHTSSTAvT 7-9 (1979); see also supra note 156.

158. von Holleben, Der Standort indusriellerAnagen unter dent Gesihtsptntkt des Paw. 5
.VL I BhnSehG, 1977 GFWERBE-ARCIiv 45; and Schoeck, Richter als Zivifisations:ensoren,
1977 ENERGIWIRTSCH.uFrI'iCIi

"FAGESFRAGEN 253, respectively.
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profession.1
Tactical and political considerations, however, were probably not
decisive. Rather, the tenor and content ofjudicial opinions suggest that
the judiciary's insistence upon existing standing barriers was motivated
by a more general desire to stabilize public law against politicization.
While standing barriers rarely matter very much in nuclear power litigation, they do play an important role in environmental lawsuits not
directed against large projects, and for exactly this reason, the Federal
Administrative Court has taken care that "big" environmental lawsuits
do not generate new legal doctrines that could spill over into other
fields of administrative law. Adherence to traditional standing doctrines
has allowed the judiciary to stem the tide and to control the development of case law.
The Court's defense of the protective norms doctrine illustrates this
point. Attacks on this doctrine and its allegedly implausible results have
accompanied it since its creation. Lawyers sympathetic to the environmental movement proposed to do away with the doctrine altogether,
and to replace the search for a legally protected interest (i.e., a right)
with a search for the factual effect upon third parties. 160 The proposal
to replace protective norms with what would have amounted to an
"injury-in-fact" test would have led to drastically lower standing barriers. In a very doctrinaire 1981 opinion, regarding the Stade nuclear
power plant, the Federal Administrative Court rejected any such suggestion. It ruled that exposure to ionized rays below an administratively
determined level was not a litigable claim. 16 1 The Court held further
that statutes and provisions dealing with the removal and storage of
nuclear waste were not "protective," and hence did not confer private
rights. It limited the geographical boundaries of "neighborhood," and
159. E.g., Isensee, Widerstandgegen den technischen Fortschrill, 1983 DIE OFFENTLICHE
565; and Neumann, supra note 154. Cf Hofmann, Atomgeset: und Rechl
auf Leben und Gesundheit, 1983 BAYERISCHE VERWALTUNGSBLXrER 33 (1983). This
article is a review of DEGENHART, KERNENERGIERECHT, SCHWERPUNKTE-ENTSCHEIDUNGSSTRUKTUREN-ENTWICKLUNCSLINIEN (1981), which is an ambitious and
influential attempt to demonstrate that the peculiar problems arising in mass litigation over nuclear power plants can and should be solved within the context of traditional, highly individualistic legal doctrines. The reviewer (one of the few outspoken
opponents of nuclear power among legal scholars) notes that Degenhart makes no
VERWALTUNG

attempt to conceal his positive attitude towards the use of nuclear power and appears
unperturbed by the social disruption that accompanies nuclear power litigation, and
comments that Degenhart's legal "edifice remains unshaken (by those disruptions)
and fits well into the broad outlines of the dominant legal opinion." Id. at 33.

160. E.g., Sening, Abschied von der Schutznorntheorie in .Vaturschuttrecht, 1980 N.rtR
102 (1980), and Sening .Aeue Literaturzu Uimweltfrgen-und einige egdkende

UND RECHT

Gedanken zur .Venenings-(un)fit'higkeit der Rechisprechung, 1982

NATUR UND

RECIT 94

(1982). The author, a judge on a Bavarian administrative court, goes so far as to
assert that a demise of the protective norms doctrine would have "saved" the environment. An overview of the rather hostile responses to Sening is Keller, Rettuing der
Umwelt dutch qAfgabe der Schutznormtheorie? 1981 BAYERISCHE VERWALTt1NGSBI.ATrER
681.
161. 61 Bf'e)rnG 256 (1981). Comparable decisions under the BhinSchG are: 65

BI'entGE 313, 320 (1982) and 69 BI'e)nGE 37. 42

(1984).
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tightened the requirements for third parties' claim substantiation. The
Court's decision reversed a lower court's holding to the effect that in
principle, every provision of construction law could be protective.
While this reversal disappointed legal scholars who had read environmental case law as evidence for an upcoming revolution in third party
litigation, the "dominant opinion" celebrated it as an overdue correc162
tion and clarification.
Further examples of the judiciary's adherence to traditional, individualistic legal principles could be added. Whatever aspect of public
law one examines, it turns out that German courts prefer somewhat
implausible rules and distinctions-such as the one between "protective" and "non-protective" provisions-to no rules at all.
The defeat of public interest litigation in the legislative arena was
marked by a similar combination of political calculation and more general, principled considerations. The CDU/CSU was able to block statutory provisions for group litigation because environmental statutes
required changes in the constitutional distribution of competences
between the federal and state governments. Since these changes
required two-thirds majorities in both houses of parliament, environmentalists and SPD/FDP parliamentarians who favored group litigation
had to compromise. Controversial provisions for public interest litigation might have kept environmental statutes from being enacted in the
63
first place, a result which proponents of the statutes wanted to avoid.1
Still, the legislature's failure to facilitate environmental groups'
access to court was not simply a matter of partisanship. The SPD/FDP
government could have overcome the CDU/CSU's opposition to collective litigation-for example, by introducing provisions for group litigation into statutes that did not require constitutional changes and two1 64
thirds majorities. The SPD was divided over public interest litigation,
however, and the government did not seriously pursue it.
Beyond an immediate desire to "rescue" the government's energy
program, the legislators' aversion to environmental association lawsuits
was based upon considerations of the broader consequences. Legislators realized that uninhibited court access would open the system not
1 65
only to environmentalists but to non-environmental groups as well.
The likely result-a system of pervasive judicial oversight exercised at
the behest of private attorneys general' 6 6 -was considered undesirable
162. The decision has approvingly been described as a "decisive" point in the
Court's efforts to preserve the principles of individual legal protection and to exclude

public risks and concerns from judicial consideration. Kloepfer, Rechtsscudlz im
76 VERWALTUNGS-ARCHiv 371, 383 (1985).
163. Rehbinder, AgunenIte fi'- die I'erbandsklage hn Omwelfrecl,, 1976 ZEITSCHRIFr
FORR RECHTSPOLITIK 157, 158.
164. Siiddeutsche Zeitung, July 14, 1979 and Feb. 28, 1980.
165. Weyreuther, in CONTRA UND PRO VERBANDSKLAGE 26 (1976).
166. This fear is voiced by, e.g., F. WEYREuTHER, supra note 24, at 26-30. 41.
Umweltschltz,
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by the legislature.1 6 7 Even the reforms, proposed or realized, that were
intended to simplify the nuclear licensing process were not entirely a
matter of a ruthless, unprincipled push for more nuclear power. The
proposal for the construction of reactors by legislative permit, for example, was advanced not only because parliamentary decisions seemed easier to achieve than the generation of consensus in the implementation
phase, but also because it had the potential of increasing the legitimacy
of political decisions concerning the construction of nuclear facilities.' 6 8
The legal experts who advised the legislature and the government on
matters of association standing in environmental disputes were not concerned with the future of nuclear energy but rather with the legitimacy
9
of collective litigation and judicial oversight of administrative activity. 16
Both the depth and the principled quality of the judicial, legislative,
and scholarly hostility towards public interest litigation in West Germany show that the legal barriers to collective litigation are not accidental or politically motivated. They were purposefully designed, and
consciously maintained, so as to keep organized interests out of court.
What explains this premeditated exclusion of environmental and other
"underrepresented" interest groups from West Germany's legal system?
From a comparative perspective, this is the wrong question to ask.
By comparison to any country but the United States, Germany's legal
system is quite hospitable towards both environmental plaintiffs and private challenges of agency action in general. 170 Thus, in examining the
causes of the rejection of public interest litigation in the Federal Republic, it is crucial to examine the causes of such litigation's rapid and widespread acceptance in the United States. A reasonably complete
examination of this subject would fill a book. The cursory remarks in
the remainder of this article are intended to suggest that the development of German and American administrative law with regard to standing to sue and public interest litigation has been profoundly affected by
two interrelated factors: institutional organization, that is, the difference between Germany's parliamentary system, and the presidential system in the United States; and different legal traditions.
167. The fear of a complete transformation of administrative law was not altogether unwarranted. When Hesse authorized environmental groups to sue under its
nature protection statute, associations of taxpayers, parents, radio and television
users, trade unions and employers, as well as the national automobile club argued
that the restriction of interest group litigation to environmental issues was illegitimate. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Sept. 28, 1979.
168. Kn6pfel, I'enechtlichung uod Interesse, in VERRECTLrCHUNG 77, 79 (Voigt ed.

1980).
169. Infra notes 204-18, 222-29 and accompanying text.

170. This is regularly stressed in the German legal literature. E.g.. Kloepfer.
Rechischul- in Umeelischutz, 76 VERWALTtNGs-ARCHiv 371, 379 (1985): "It can hardl%

be disputed that in its scope and intensity, the legal protection currently provided in
environmental law (in the Federal Republic) likely [iwohl] represents a phenomenon
that is singular in the world" (Author's trans.). The one exception is public interest
litigation in the United States.
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The Origins of Public Interest Litigation

The genesis of public interest litigation in the United States and its
rejection in the Federal Republic were marked by calculations of power,
and can be explained in part in terms of power. Public interest litigation
increases the frequency and scope of judicial review of agency action.
This strengthens the power of the courts and the hands of outside intervenors in the administrative process.1 71 The virtual demise of standing
in the United States has transferred discretion from administrators to
private interests, who come to be in a position to decide which lawsuits
to bring and which legal standards to enforce. i72 Simultaneously, public interest litigation has reduced executive control and leadership.
In the 1960s, the American judiciary showed little reluctance to
increase its powers by drastically expanding the class of potential plaintiffs and the circumstances under which they could sue. 17 3 Some scholars have argued that this development reflected the Supreme Court's
orientation towards dominant political constituencies; 1 74 others have
interpreted it as a reaction to manifest failures of the political process,
especially of administrative agencies.1 75 Whatever the correct explanation may be, the judiciary showed a remarkable confidence in its authority and competence to oversee and, occasionally, to reform
administrative agencies. For example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia took it upon itself "to see that important legislative
purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected
in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy." 1 76 This enterprise represented a marked expansion of the judiciary's mission and purpose.
However, public interest litigation was not simply a unilateral judicial grab for power. Congress could easily have imposed statutory
restrictions on standing to sue. But Congress has done exactly the
opposite. Since the early 1970s, it has persistently expanded statutory
171. The new, "reformed" administrative law is, of course, intended to give "underrepresented interests" an opportunity to counteract the "capture" of agencies by
regulated industries. Cf Stewart, The Reformation of American Admtinistrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975). R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS (1983) is an
instructive account of the ways in which public interest litigation strengthens the
influence of environmental interest groups in the regulatory process.
172. Orren, Standing to Sue: Interest Group Coflict in FederalCourts, 70 Ai. POL. Sci.

REV. 723, 724 (1976) (transfer of discretion is a consequence of demise of standing).
173. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1967).
174. The argument that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has been motivated by
a strategy of building and maintaining a political constituency has been advanced
most forcefully by M. Shapiro, The Supreme Court: From Mlarren to Binger, in THE NEW
A,tERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 179-212 (A. King ed. 1980).

175. The "others" include the courts themselves. E.g., United Church of Christ v.
Federal Communications Comm'n, 359 F.2d 994, 1004, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1966); and
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111
(D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. 462 U.S. 87 (1983). Cf also Stewart, The Reformation of.merican Admhis-

trative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667 (1975).
176. Calvert Cliffs
CoordinathigComm. . Atomic Enegy Cumi 'n,
449 F.2d at 1111.
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rights to sue, most notably in environmental law, 177 but also in other
areas, such as consumer protection. 178 It has ensured that public interest intervenors will make use of their opportunities to seek judicial
review of agency action by legislating more than 150 provisions for
79
court-awarded attorney's fees.'
This phenomenon is understandable only in the context of the
theory of separation of powers, which locks the legislature and the executive in a persistent struggle for power. The United States Congress has
an institutional interest not only in usurping executive power for itself
but also in delegating it to others, including the judiciary and special
interest groups.' 8 0 Wary of an "imperial presidency" and suspicious of
a "run-away bureaucracy," Congress has used judicial adjudication as
an instrument of control over government agencies. Partisan-political
considerations have amplified its institutional interests. Not by coincidence, the growth and consolidation of the citizen suit mechanism fall in
a period of American history during which the Congress has been dominated by the Democratic party, and the presidency, with the exception of
the Carter years, by the Republicans.
The legislative motive to use judicial oversight as a mechanism of
controlling the executive does not exist in a system where the executive
is elected (and can be dismissed) by the legislature. West Germany's
parliamentary government is such a system. The legislature has no reason to curtail the authority of what is, after all, "its" executive.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the German legislature's restrictive
position towards not only collective litigation but also environmental
interest group participation in the administrative process betrayed a
desire to preserve the integrity of the political process, and to protect
the government bureaucracy from unwarranted, uncontrollable interference. Even the SPD/FDP government, which was firmly committed to
"more democracy" and to the liberalization of the legal system, failed to
implement proposals for public interest litigation.
177. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
178. E.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2060(a) (1982) (authorizing
suits by "any person adversely affected" or "any consumer or consumer organization"); and Magnuson Moss Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(1) (1982) (authorizing
challenges to FTC rules by "any interested person [including a consumer or consumer organization"].
179. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
180. This strategy may even be preferable to a straightforward congressional arro-

gation of (formerly) executive power. Members of congress cannot be held directly

accountable for the public interest lawsuits they authorize, and can plausibly deny
responsibility when the results, though liked by some members, are politically
unpalatable. This might not work if public interest plaintiffs undertook actions that
inflict serious harm upon important constituencies. Cf R. MELNICK, REr1IATiON AND
THE COURTS 18-23 (1983). But Melnick's meticulous study of the Clean Air Act
shows that this rarely happens. Public interest groups and courts have a very good
sense of how far they can go without weakening congressional support for the legislation. Built-in safeguards, then, allow Congress to control the political damage that
might be entailed by the delegation of authority to courts and public interest groups.
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In both countries, the legislature's attitude towards judicial oversight of bureaucracy has influenced the extent to which the judiciary has
been willing to exercise its powers. When in doubt, American courts
generally have been very generous in granting standing and attorneys
fees to public interest interveners, because they know that Congress
wants the respective statutory provisions to be interpreted liberally. 18 '
The German judiciary, on the other hand, has been influenced by harsh
legislative and scholarly criticism of its approach to nuclear power litigation and by legislative attempts to "correct" instances of judicial over82
reach in these cases.'
Despite its apparent simplicity, this explanation is a little too mechanistic. The development of administrative law in the United States and
West Germany has been influenced, not only by calculations of power,
but also by ideological conceptions and expectations about democratic
government and law.
Naturally, the legal establishment, most prominently scholars and
judges, has significantly influenced the direction of administrative law
development in both the United States and West Germany. In the
United States, there has been a broad consensus for public interest litigation among legal scholars, judges, and the legal establishment in general. In the Federal Republic, there is a similarly broad consensus
against it. Judges on the Federal Constitutional Court and the Federal
Administrative Court voiced their opposition to association lawsuits not
only on the bench but also in legal periodicals and in public.' 8 3 The
scope of individual rights and judicial review in environmental litigation
have been a standard topic at the conventions of important professional
legal organizations. On these occasions, proposals for association
standing have been regularly defeated. Suggestions for an expansion of
individual rights have been defeated with equal regularity, often amidst
complaints that the existing framework of legal protection was already
excessive. 184
181. Boyer &Meidinger, PrivatizingRegulatoly Enforcement, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 833,
839 (1985).
182. See supra notes 147-59 and accompanying text.
183. E.g., F. WEYREUTHER, supra note 24; Schlichter, Die I'erbandsklage im
'erwaltungsprozess, 1982

UMWELT- UND PLANUNGSREcHT

209;

BENDA, VERFASSUNGSAUF-

TRAG UND UMWELTSCHUTZ: GEGEN VERBANDSKLAGE UND UMWELTGRUNDREcHT (1982).

When these critiques of association lawsuits appeared, Weyreuther and Schlichter
were members of the Federal Administrative Court; Benda, a member of the Federal
Constitutional Court. Cf. NEUMEYER, supra note 26, at 54-55 (president of the Hesse
appellate administrative court publicly criticizes association lawsuits, and urges that
provisions authorizing such suits be repealed); CONTRA UND PRO VERBANKSKLAGE
(1976).
184. Cf Ule & Lauuinger, Empfehlen sich unter dem Gesichlspunki der Gewdhrleistung
notw'endigen C'muelischtzes eginzende Regehngen im I'erwaltungsvefahrensund I'ervaltungsprozessrecht?, Gutachen B in 52. DEUTrsCHEN JURIsTENTAG (1978); Marburger, Ausbai des hidvidualschutzesgegen ('mineltbelastungen als Aufgabe des bfi'gerlicien und ffentlichen
Rechlis, Gutlachlen C in 56. DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAG (1986); Kloepfer, Rechisschut- im
L'mweltschittz, 76 VERVALTUNGs-ARCHiv 371 (1985) and 77 VERwALTuNGs-ARCHrIv 30
(1986). Compare further the examples mentioned by Eiberle-Herm, supra note 80, at
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It may be that German judges and scholars are politically somewhat
more conservative than their American colleagues (although we lack
data to test this hypothesis), but the views of the German legal profession concerning public interest litigation are not simply more restrictive
than those of the American legal elite. In West Germany, positions
analogous to those espoused by mainstream American legal scholars
and embodied in the justiciability doctrines of American courts' 85 have
been denounced as the result of ecological extremism, ideological zealotry, or worse. 18 6 This difference is much too sharp to be accounted for
by whatever differences may exist between the political views of the legal
elites. It can only be explained in the context of the very different legal
traditions within which the debate about public interest litigation took
shape in the two countries.
As has been mentioned, German public law distinguishes sharply
between law and politics, rights and policies. 187 These distinctions arise
from, and are central to, the tradition of a sovereign state that, standing
above warring social interests, determines the public interest: law is the
most basic mechanism by which the state's sovereign authority is segregated from private rights and interests. Restrictive standing rules are
one of the legal instruments that maintain the categorical distinction
between law and politics, rights and the public interest. They prevent
the politicization of legal claims, the judicialization of executive decision-making, and the arrogation of sovereign law-enforcement authority
88
by private parties.1
The United States, of course, has no comparable tradition of sovereign authority. Indeed, the central insight of the framers was that sovereignty could be split among different branches of government.
Consequently, the division between public authority on the one hand
and private interests on the other has never been particularly sharp, and
the distinction between law and politics, rights and policies, has far less
doctrinal and political support than it does on the European continent.
The long-standing tradition of sovereign authority goes a long way
towards explaining the remarkable stability German public law has
shown over the past two decades. Conversely, the rapid, full-scale
acceptance of public interest litigation in the United States may in large
264-65, who also mentions one meeting of a lawyers' association coming out in favor
of increased legal protection and association lawsuits.
185. Cf supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text. Note, in particular, that many

justiciability decisions that appear extreme from a "German" perspective were

handed down by the moderately conservative Burger Court; e.g., United States v.
Students to Challenge Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP I), 412 U.S. 669
(1973). See also Chayes, supra note 5.

186. Specifically, these doctrines have been labelled totalitarian. Cf infra note 212.
187. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
188. The argument that high standing barriers and the widespread hostility
towards collective forms of litigation stem from the sharp distinction between state
and society that has shaped the history of legal theory in German' is also made by
FABER, supra note 86, at 7-8; and GOERLITZ, VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN
DEUTSCHLAND 24-48, 73-75 (1970).
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part be attributed to the lack of such a tradition.' 8 9
To begin with, the mere existence of a highly doctrinal public law
system in Germany, and the much less doctrinal character of American
administrative law, have made a difference in terms of stability. German
administrative law developed during the nineteenth century as a series
of compromises between monarchies which controlled large centralized
bureaucracies, and a liberal bourgeoisie which sought to secure its property rights against the proletarian mob.' 9 0 Accordingly, Germany's
administrative legal system has historically placed a high premium upon
the integrity of political control over bureaucracy. Under no circumstances could independent courts be permitted to interfere with the
state's sovereign authoritative political decision-making and centralized
executive control over the bureaucracy. Ifjudicial review by independent courts was to be permitted at all,' 9 ' it had to be strictly confined to
the defense of private, individual rights. A system of public law based
192
upon these principles was in place by the early twentieth century,
which meant that a great deal of theoretical ingenuity and practical political interest had gone into it before it was challenged by democratic (primarily socialist) forces. To this day, the highly doctrinaire, systematized
body of public law is the core and pride of German jurisprudence. For
almost a century, German public law has proven highly resistant to democratic demands raised in the name of substantive values, such as social
equality and welfare or a clean environment. To put it bluntly, the doctrinal baggage of more than a century does not go overboard because
189. It has been argued that restrictive standing doctrines on the European Continent stem from the tradition of an autocratic monarchy, which still dominates the
executive. See L. JAFFE, supra note 128, at 477-78. The argument in the text is a
variation on this theme.
190. GOERLITZ, Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeitin Deutschland (1970).

191. This question was extremely controversial. Cf infra notes 207-08.
192. The most important contribution to this system-and in many respects its

basis-was Otto Mayer's imposing work, DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSRECHT (3d ed.
1924). The first systematic treatises on the core of administrative law, the system (or
the "concept"-Begfi) of subjective public rights (i.e., individual rights against the
state) were JELLINEK, DAS SYSTEM DER SUBJEKTIVEN OFFENTLICHEN RECHTE (2d ed.
1905), and Ottmar Biihler's even more influential work, DIE SUBJEKTIVEN 6FFENTLICHEN RECHTE UND IHR SCHUTZ IN DER DEUTSCHEN VERWALTUNGSRECHTSPRECHUNG

(1914). To be sure, the case law was somewhat messier than these "systems" may
suggest. Still, Biihler claimed, in the positivist spirit of the times and with considerable justification, that his book was nothing but a systematic description of the existing
case law. Four decades later, the author claimed, again with considerable justification, that his conception of subjective public rights had proven a sound and practicable basis of administrative jurisprudence and that it was bound to blossom fully
under the conditions of liberal democracy. Biihler, Altes und Neues iiber Begif und
Bedeutung der subjektiven 6ffentlichen Rechte, in FORSCHUNGEN UND BERICHTE AUS DEM
OEFFENTLICHEN RECHT (GEDACHTNISSCHRIFT W. JELLINEK) 269, 270-74, 286 (1955).
Biihler's writings are still considered the basis for the contemporary theory of subjective public rights. Cf H. Bauer's exhaustive and illuminating treatment of the history
and theory of the system of subjective public rights, GESCHICHTLICHE GRUNDLAGEN
DER LEHRE VOM SUBJEKTIVEN OFFENTLICHEN RECH-T (1986).
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people get upset about carcinogens or acid rain. 19 3
American administrative law has never had such a secure foothold. 194 During the nineteenth century there were federal governmental bodies which we now would think of as bureaucracies. The Post
Office is an example. But, these institutions and the law that governed
them were thought of as separate and distinct from the common law and
they were somewhat suspect as a source of general legal principle. No
attempts were made to reconcile the rule of law systematically with the
existence of a bureaucracy. When, around the turn of the century,
administrative law became its own field, it was largely the law of
independent agencies, whose shape and structure was more a matter of
legislative improvisation and experimentation than of systematic
thought or action. The resulting law was again a series of uneasy compromises between the common law tradition, a Constitution hostile to
big government, and the alleged needs of the administrative state.
Although attempts were made, well into the 1920s, to systematize the
law on the basis of general principles, these were brought to an end by
the New Deal and Realist jurisprudence, which were not interested in
abstract principles and system-building, but celebrated the virtue of
"expertise" in government.' 9 5 From the need of rational administration, everything else followed: broad delegations of authority, bureaucratic flexibility, and a narrow scope of judicial review. The
independent regulatory commission, which embodied this theory of
administrative law, bore the marks of an institution squeezed into a legal
framework neither made nor meant for large bureaucracies. The
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 ("APA"),' 9 6 which comes closer
to a general administrative code than any other piece of legislation, was
a compromise between the New Dealers and their opponents. It was
built largely upon the case law that had grown around independent
agencies up to that point.' 97 The APA was emphatically not a system of
administrative law; it was, at best "a formula upon which opposing social
98
and political forces have come to rest."'
193. The fact that Germany became a democracy only after it had become a Rechtsstaat has been considered significant not only with regard to public law and especially

collective litigation (e.g.,

FABER, DIE VERBANDSKLAGE IM VERWALTUNGSPROZESS

64

(1972)), but also for the country's political development in general. DAHRENDORF,
SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY 196-97 (1967).
194. This paragraph is based upon B. ACKERMANN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN

LAW 7-14 (1984), who conveys a much better sense of the development of the law and

legal thought before the New Deal than I am able to provide here. Among the many
sources Ackermann cites, particular mention must be made of W. CHASE, THE AMERICAN L w SCHOOL AND THE RISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT
195. E.g., J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).

(1982).

196. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-03 (1982).
197. An instructive brief overview over the development and the history of the
APA is Williams, Fifty 1'ears of the Law of the Federal Administrati'e.4gencies-.4nd Beyond.
29 FED. BARJ. 267 (1970).

198. Wong Yang Sung v. MacGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1949) (Jackson, J.). The
unsystematic character of the APA is reflected in its general phrases and provisions.
For example, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982) (originally sec. 10(a)), the general judicial review
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This formula, moreover, was largely dismantled by the courts only
two decades after it had been enacted. In the United States, neither
bureaucracy nor its supposed raison d'etre-expertise-have ever been
accorded the measure of legitimacy which the executive bureaucracy
enjoys in many European countries.1 99 When in the 1960s, disorientation and uneasiness gave way to hostility and distrust towards the
"experts," it seemed sound policy to replace them with judges and
"concerned citizens," that is to say amateurs and dilettantes. Politicians,
legal scholars, judges, and public interest advocates hoped detailed participation procedures and disclosure requirements, a broader scope of
judicial review, and citizen standing would make administration more
lawful, less susceptible to "special interests," and more beneficial to
"the public interest." Since American administrative law was not nearly
as doctrinal and as highly systematized as German public law, it lacked
the resilience to withstand political pressure for its transformation.
One may easily discern the force of these different traditions in the
academic and political discussion about public interest law, which was
considerably more thorough and fundamental in West Germany than in
the United States. In America, the debate about public interest litigation has, to a much larger extent than in the Federal Republic, revolved
around pragmatic questions, such as the judiciary's increased workload
and its institutional competence to handle difficult technical questions.2 0 0 The legitimacy of extensive judicial review of administrative
action has, with few exceptions, 20 1 been taken for granted. Concerns
over the potentially anti-democratic implications of public interest litigation have been met with far more frequent and vocal assurances that
public interest litigation is compatible with,2 0 2 or is an expansion of,
20 3
democratic principles.
In sharp contrast, the discussion in West Germany primarily
focused not on the anticipated practical problems with public interest
provision, states that a person is entitled to judicial review when "adversely affected

or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute" (emphasis added).
The unifying, systematizing force of this provision is obviously very limited.
199. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY, 8-11, 48-55 (1978).
200. See, e.g., Leventhal, Environmental Decision-making and the Role of the Conrts, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974); and Whitney, The Casefor Creating a Special Enviromnental
Court System, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473 (1973).
201. Among the few areJ. Rabkin, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS, How PUBLIC LAw DisTORTS PUBLIC POLICY; Scalia, The Doctrineof Standing as an EssentialElement of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881 (1983).
202. This, in fact, was the very premise of increasing the representation of "underrepresented interests" by means of public interest litigation. The public interest law
movement understands itself emphatically as a democratic force. E.g., G. HARRISON
& S, JAFFE, THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAw FIRM: NEW VOICES FOR NEw CONSTITUENCIES

(1973); and M. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY (1986).
203. E.g., Denvir, Towards a PoliticalTheory of Public Interest Litigation, 54 N.C. L. REV.

1133, 1160 passim (1976).
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litigation,20 4 but on the institutional consequences ofjudicial control of
administrative action outside the context of private rights.2 0 5 Standing
requirements in the form of credible private rights claims are defended
with great scholarly determination not only because they preserve the
integrity of executive control over the bureaucracy, 20 6 but also because
they safeguard the independence of thejudiciary. Again, this concern is
best understood in its historical context.
During the formative period of German public law and until the
Nazi seizure of power, two very different models of administrative jurisprudence emerged. The "objective legality" model, associated mostly
with the works of Rudolf von Gneist, 20 7 was based upon bureaucracy's
strict adherence to positive legal norms. A system of comprehensive
judicial oversight would be required to attain this goal. This meant, inter
alia, that a principled doctrine of standing was not only unnecessary but
undesirable: private suits in the defense of individual rights cannot
bring about systematic judicial control of administrative decision-making. The defenders of the other, "individual rights" model-most
prominently, Bahr and Sarwey, 20 8 stressed that perfect legality of
administrative behavior was not required. Rather, the protection of private, individual rights against the government was needed. This had to
be the exclusive purpose of the judiciary vis-a-vis the government.
The two models entailed very different consequences for the organization of the (administrative) 20 9 judiciary. Defenders of the objective
legality model argued that administrative courts should be an integral
part of the bureaucracy. The advocates of the individual rights model
never thought that there was something theoretically inconsistent or
politically impracticable about such an arrangement. But they considered courts "inside" the bureaucracy to be incapable of protecting indi204. Although concerns such as overcrowded court dockets were voiced on occasion: e.g., FABER, DIE VERBANDSKLAGE IM VERWALTUNGSPROZESs 83-84 (1972); and F.
WEYREu-THER, supra note 24, at 69-70.
205. See infra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
206. Cf Baumann, supra note 26, at 257-58; supra notes 2-20 and accompanying
text; Brohm, Die staatliche Ierwallung als eigenstdndige Gewalt und die Grenzen der 1'envaltungsgerichtsbarkeit, 1986 DEUtSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATr 321.
207. E.g., DER RECHTSSTAAT UND DIE VERWALTUNGSGERICHTE IN DEUTSCHL.AND (2d
ed. 1879). On von Gneist's enormous influence as an author and a judge on the

Prussian Oberverwaltungsge-icht, cf

VON UNRUH,

VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT

IM

VERFASSUNGSSTAAT, PROBLEME UND ENTWICKLUNG (1984).
208. BHR, DER RECHTSSTAAT (1864); VON SARWEY, DAS 6FFENTLICHE RECHT LND
DIE VERWALTUNGSRECHTSPFLEGE (1880).
209. The dispute was complicated by a split among advocates of the subjective
rights model. Some of them wanted specialized (but independent) administrative
courts to protect individual rights against the state, arguing that (1) the ordinary (i.e.,
civil) courts lacked a sufficient understanding of public administration; and (2) the
structure of lawsuits against the state was altogether different from that of civil litigation. Others feared that courts with special expertise in public adminstration might
have too much sympathy with the bureaucracy, and therefore wanted suits against the
government to be handled by ordinary courts. A discussion of this dispute is beyond
the scope of this Article. The Federal Republic, of course, opted for the model of
independent administrative courts.
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vidual rights. Only an organizationally and personally independent
judiciary would be in a position to perform this task. In order to do so,
however, the administrative judiciary would also have to be substantively
independent from the bureaucracy. It would have to adjudicate cases
strictly from the perspective of private rights, rather than from the
bureaucracy's perspective of regularity, feasibility, or convenience. Public interest litigation-that is, judicial authority not grounded in private
rights-would eliminate the distance between judges and bureaucrats
2 10
that is a precondition of judicial independence.
Both sides to this historic controversy, then, shared the premise
that an administrative judiciary that provided comprehensive control of
objective legality was unthinkable as an independent judiciary: it would be
an intrinsically political institution, and too powerful to be permitted to
escape the government's control. 21 ' Precisely because they acknowledged the inescapable institutional consequence of the objective legality
model, the advocates of the individual rights model argued that the protection of private rights had to be the administrative judiciary's exclusive
purpose. This required, inter alia, a rigorous, principled doctrine of
2 12
standing.
The controversy over the nature of the administrative judiciary had
a profound influence upon public law and judicial institutions in the
German states. The objective legality model and its institutional manifestation, the administrative judiciary "inside" the bureaucracy, were
implemented in Prussia and other Northern states; the individual rights
model and independent courts, in several Southern states. This continued to be the case during the Weimar Republic. Neither model existed
in its pure form. 21 3 But despite the somewhat muddled institutional
210. The argument that the administrative judiciary has to have a different (i.e.,

subjective rights) "perspective" in order to gain a substantive and institutional "distance" from the bureaucracy and its standpoint of feasibility goes back to BXEHR, DER
REcrrssTAAT 54-55 (1864) and has been a standard topos of German legal theory ever
since. The reasoning that only an administrative judiciary that has some "distance" to
the bureaucracy can be truly independent and protect the rights of individuals underlies the individualistic interpretation of Basic Law, art. 19(4) and ,vGO § 42(2) (dis-

cussed supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text), and is still very much a part of legal
discourse. E.g., Krebs, Subjektiver Rechtsschulz und objektive Rechtskontrolle, in SYSTEM
DES VERWALTUNGSGERICHTLICHEN RECHTSSCHUTZES (FESTSCHRIFr MENGER)

191, 194

(Erichsen ed. 1985); Schmidt-Assmann, Merwaltungskontrolle und Ve-aaltungsgericlitsbarkeit, 34

VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN

DES VERBANDS

DEUTSCHER STAATSRECHTSLEHRER

211, 244-45 (1976); and Kloepfer, Rechtsschutz in Lnieltschulz, 77 VERAVALTUNGSARCHLY 30, 34-35 (1986).
211. See supra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
212. The subjective rights model further entailed substantial restrictions on the
scope ofjudicial review. Administrative discretion, violations of rules without "external force," and even potential violations of rules that do not directly affect the plaintiff before the court were subject to no judicial review. Again, this was considered
necessary to preserve thejudiciary's distinctive perspective. Krebs, Subjekth'er Rechisschulz und objektive Reckiskontrolle, in SYSTEM DES VERWALTUNGSGERICHTLICHEN RECHTS-

SCHTZES, supra note 210, at 191, 192-96.
213. The Prussian system in particular was a hybrid between the two models. The
lower courts were part of the bureaucracy; the highest administrative court (the
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reality, and despite an increasing awareness that there was a considerable overlap between the two systems, it continued to be well understood
that the models were different and, in fact, incompatible. 21 4 Ajudiciary
that possessed both institutional independence and the authority to
ensure abstract legality continued to be considered an impossibility.
The Nazi years did nothing to change this perception. Building
upon, and often distorting, the ideas of Prussian legal theorists, Nazi
jurists denounced the subjective rights model as a liberal-bourgeois
monstrosity. The objective legality model, on the other hand, was found
to be at least theoretically compatible with the organization of the "New
State." An administrative judiciary under the state's tutelage and a roving commission to ensure strict legality would see to it that the Fdthrer's
purposes would not be lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the
21 5
Reich's bureaucracy.
In the light of this historical experience, the Federal Republic opted
explicitly and resolutely for the subjective, individual rights model and
an independent administrative judiciary. 21 6 The objective legality
Oberverwaltungsgericht) enjoyed considerable personal independence and acted like a
genuine court, at least much of the time. Cf STUMP, PREUSSISCHE VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT, 1875 BIS 1914, VERFASSUNG-VERFAHREN-ZUSTANDIGKEIT

(1980).

214. Cf Krebs, supra note 212, at 191-96.
215. Cf., e.g., Kersten, Die Entwicklung und Ausgestallung der I'ewualtungsgerichltsbarkeit
(Diss. Freiburg, 1936); and Nagler, Die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeitim nationalsozialistischen
Rechtsaufbau (Diss. Breslau, 1937). These volumes, which differ in the degree of their
offensiveness, illustrate that the legal scholars who during the 1970's noted an affinity between proposals for collective environmental litigation and Nazi jurisprudence
were not hysterical. See infra note 219. Kersten and Nagler (as well as numerous
authors whose works they cite) denounce the theory of subjective rights against the
state as incompatible with the principles of the Fiihrerstaat;Kersten, supra at 34; Nagler, supra at 66-74. Kersten explains that a Ftihrersiaatmore than any other political
system depends upon an administration that implements the common will with the
utmost rigor, and that comprehensive judicial oversight by a reliable administrative
judiciary is conducive to this goal. Kersten, supra at 22-38. In order to demonstrate
that administrative law serves not the protection of private rights but the "realization
of the legal orderper se," id. at 38, 78, and in order to maximizejudicial oversight, the
bureaucracy should be permitted to sue itself when it is uncertain about the legality
of an envisioned action. Id. at 77-78.
Nagler describes proposals to permit public interest litigation (Popularklagen) as
theoretically compelling from a nationalist-socialist point of view. Nagler, supra at
70-71. Fearing "a flood of unjustified and frivolous lawsuits," he considers public
interest litigation impracticable. However, he emphatically rejects standing requirements in the form of a private rights test, and proposes to grant standing to everyone
whose "interests" are somehow "affected." Cf Meyn, Zur Frage der Abgrenzung von
Justiz- und Tewvaltungszustdndigkeit bi neuen Staal (Diss. Muenster, 1937).
216. Grundgesetz, art. 19(4) and rwGO, § 42(2) are the most important manifestations of this fundamental decision. Cf supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
The controversy between Gneist on the one hand and Biihr and Sarwey on the other
was not some obscure historical dispute to the legal scholars who shaped German
public law after World War II. There was an acute awareness that the new administrative judicial system could be designed along the lines of either model. The decision for a system of individual legal protection and independent courts was heavily
influenced by Walter Jellinek and other prominent scholars who had been staunch
defenders of the subjective rights model during the Weimar Republic. On the formative period of West German administrative law, see Ule, Die neue I'enevalltmgsgericits-
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model became irrevocably associated with authoritarian and totalitarian
regimes. Throughout the history of the Federal Republic, the administrative courts (and the Federal Constitutional Court) have greatly
expanded the rights that individual citizens can claim against the
state.2 1 7 These efforts were applauded and promoted by the vast majority of legal scholars; a generous theory of individual rights was regarded
as the cornerstone of a legal and political system that viewed private
individuals not as the sovereign's subjects but as free and independent
citizens. Nevertheless, judges and scholars alike continued to insist that
judicial review of administrative action had to be tied strictly to the protection of individual rights, 21 8 and that control of administrative behavior could be no more than incidental to that protection. This explains
thejudiciary's aversion to collective litigation and its painstaking efforts
to separate individual rights from public interest claims. This also
explains the occasionally shrill tone of scholarly criticism ofjudicial decisions in environmental cases that seemed to go beyond the bounds of
2 19
individual legal protection.
The recognition that courts cannot venture beyond the bounds of
individual rights, then, is based upon painful historical experience and a
great conceptual clarity. The nearly universal acceptance of the intrinsically political nature ofjudicial review outside the private rights context
presupposes a sharp, intuitively plausible distinction between law and
rights on the one hand, and politics and public authority on the other.
The absence of similar conditions in the United States goes a long way
towards explaining the existence of public interest law-a phenomenon
in the twilight of law and politics, rights and interest representation. It
is never quite clear whether collective legal claims are an expansion of
private rights and actions, or whether they are intrinsically public, politbarkeit und

das

Verhtinis voni

Justiz

und

I'envaltang, in

l'era'altung wid

Ierwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit, Gesamnelte Aufsdtze und f'orlrdge I (Ule ed. 1979); von Unruh,
Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit,in 5 DEUTSCHE VERWALTUNGSGESCHICHTE 1178 (Jeserich ed.
1987).
217. Perhaps the single greatest expansion was the acceptance, in the 1960s, of
third party lawsuits, which effectively abolished the old doctrine that only the
addressee of an administrative action could challenge it in court. Another expansion
came with the discovery of so-called "indeterminate legal concepts" (unbestimmite
Rechtsbeg7iffe). The interpretation of such concepts, formerly considered a matter of
administrative discretion, was now held to be subject to de novo judicial review.
Finally, constitutional rights came to be interpreted very broadly. These developments and the role of legal scholars are described by Ossenbiihl, Die 11'eiterentwickhng
des Ierwallungsrechts and der 'enwalItungsreclitswissenschafi, in DEUTSCHE VERWALTUNGSGESCHICHTE, supra note 216 at 1144.
218. F. WEYREUTHER, supra note 24, at 82-84.

219. Cf supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text. Occasionally, judges and legal
scholars have gone beyond complaining about the "perversion" of the rule of law
and denounced public interest litigation and association lawsuits as part and parcel of
authoritarian, totalitarian, national-socialist legal theory. E.g., OVG Miinster, 1953
MONATSSCHRIFT DES DEUTSCHEN RECHTS 572 (association lawsuit dismissed for lack
of standing and criticized as an impermissible delegation of public power that smacks
of fascism); Weyreuther, in CONTRA UND PRO VERBANDSKLAGE 28-30 (1976), F.
WEYREUTHER,

supra note 24, at 82-84.
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ical actions and, as such, instruments of interest representation. But
neither the argument that public interest law constitutes an unwarranted
interference with sovereign authority, nor the related argument that it
endangers thejudiciary's independence, possess much plausibility in the
American context. These arguments are too theoretical and too far
removed from the experimental spirit of the legal tradition and the
pragmatic concerns of contemporary administration to play much of a
role in the United States.
By the same token, and for many of the same reasons, discourse
about the place of organized interests in the political and legal process
has been much less systematic and focused in the United States than it
has been in West Germany. In the United States, the urgency to "represent underrepresented interests" is regarded as a sufficient basis to
allow collective interest representation in court. Practical concerns over
"interlopers" and frivolous litigation subsided when it turned out that
the overwhelming majority of public interest lawsuits were brought not
by "busybodies" but by highly professional advocacy organizations.
The democratic legitimacy of these groups, although occasionally questioned in the literature, 220 has in practice been taken for granted.
In Germany, proponents of collective litigation made arguments
similar to those raised by American public interest advocates. They
claimed that "public" interests were routinely underrepresented in the
political process; that the environmental movement had a proven basis
of popular support; and that the government should not alienate the
public by denying it the opportunity to assert its basic rights in court. 22 1
These claims to democratic legitimacy, however, which were sufficient in
the United States, proved unacceptable in the Federal Republic. The
numerous opponents of public interest law argued that collective entities suing on behalf of the public would have arrogated the government's power to enforce the law, and undermined an administrative
system based on political, not judicial control. 2 22 Time and again,
scholars and politicians argued that environmental and other citizen
groups were insufficiently representative of the public, or of the segment
of the public they claimed to represent; that they lacked a sufficient
degree of internal democratic organization; and that therefore, their
participation in administrative decision-making, not to mention collec220. In the early years of public interest law, a few liberal observers questioned the
public interest movement's heavy emphasis on legal strategies and expertise, on the
grounds that attorneys might not always be able to represent the genuine interests of
their constituencies. E.g., Cahn & Cahn, Power to the People or to the Profession? The
Public in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005 (1970). Nevertheless, this criticism
never had any practical influence. The same is true of conservative critiques of the

movement's claims to represent underrepresented interests. E.g., Rabkin, Public
Interest Lau: Is It Law in the Public Interest?, 8 HARV. J. LAW & PUB. POL'y 341 (1985).

221. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
222. E.g., F. WEYREUTHER, supra note 24, at 20-23; Redeker, I"erfahrensreehtliehe
Bedenkengegen die I'erbandsklage, 1976 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR RECHTSPOLITIK 163; Kloepfer,
Rechtsschutz in 'nmeltschut:, 76 VERWALTUNGS-ARCHIV 371, 386-87 (1985).
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tive litigation, was highly problematic. 223
The persistence and success with which these arguments were made
cut to the heart of the apparent paradox that a comparatively collectivist
country such as West Germany largely prohibits collective litigation,
whereas the United States, a considerably more individualistic country,
encourages it. Organized interests do indeed occupy a prominent status
in the Federal Republic. Parties, for example, are guaranteed a constitu'2 24
tional status as participants in "the formation of the political will."
However, because interest group influence upon political institutions is
perceived as participation in the exercise of intrinsically public, sovereign authority, West Germany has been preoccupied with the where and
how of organized interest representation in the political and legal process to a much greater extent than the United States. Organized interests must not be allowed to arrogate public authority without, in turn,
being subject to the public standards of accountability and conformity
with democratic principles. This means, at a minimum, that they must
be democratically organized and representative. Periodic elections,
organizing statutes, and clear membership criteria are required. 2 25 It
also means that the points at which organized interests intervene and
the ways in which they participate in politics must be compatible with
the principles of representative democracy.
For this reason, the few groups that are allowed to litigate without
claiming a violation of private rights are subject to certain legal requirements and restrictions. 22 6 Even the environmental groups that are permitted to intervene in the administrative process under the BAVatSchG
223. E.g., Barschel, Btirgerinitiativen und parlamentarische Pareiendemoratie, 1977
ZEITSCHRI~r FUR REclrrsPoLrrIK 129, 130; Achterberg, Die parlamenlarischeDemokratie
als EntfaltungsraunmflirBiirgerinitiativen, 1978 NEUEJURISTICHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1993,
1996); Naumann, Verbandsklage und Massenprozess, 1975 GEWERBE-ARCHIV 281.

224. Grundgesetz art. 21(1). The requirements parties have to satisfy in order to
conform to a liberal, representative order are specified in a statute, the Parteiengesetz.

The status of interest groups is neither constitutionally determined nor regulated in
a single statute. But cf. infra note 225 and accompanying text.
225. Lange, Zur Anhi"nag im verwaltungsgerichtlichen Genehmigungsveifahren, 1975
DEurSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT 130, 132. This article concerns the participation of
citizen groups in administrative proceedings. During the 1970s, this was only a small

part of an intensive debate concerning the legal and political status of interest groups
in a representative democracy. Cf STAATSFU3HRUNG. VERBANDSMACHT UND INNERE
SOUVERANITAET (Biedenkopf ed. 1977); B6ckenf6rde, Die politische Funktion wirtsclafIlicli-sozialer M'erbdnde und Interessentrger in der sozialstaalichen Demokratie. 1976 DER
STAAT 457; LEsSMAN, supra note 87; K. SCHELTER, DEMOKRATISIERUNG DER VERBXENDE
(1976); HJ. SCHR6DER, GESETZGEBUNG UND VERBXNDE (1976); TEUBNER, ORGANISATIONSDEMOKRATIE UND VERBANDSVERFASSUNG (1978). The powerful influence of
interest groups in the Federal Republic and the emergence of a "citizen group movement" led to widespread-though ultimately unsuccessful-demands for an "association statute" (V'erb'ndegesetz) which would do for interest groups what the Parteiengesel(cf. supra note 224) had done for the parties-namely, clarify their constitutional status and obligations. A good overview of legislative proposals to this effect and the
debate surrounding them is VON ALEMANN & HEINZE, VERBNDE UND STAAT (2d ed.
1981).
226. These are described by Koch, Class and Public Interest Actions in German Lai'. 5

Civ.JUST. Q. 66 (1987).

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol 22

must be licensed and meet certain standards of accountability and representativeness. 2 27 If groups were allowed to litigate under the statute,
they likely would be subject to considerably more stringent
2 28
requirements.
West German insistence on democratic accountability demonstrates
a desire to separate law from politics and prevent the politicization of
law. If collective litigation is a legal instrument, the litigator must show
that he is asserting private rights. Those who claim to litigate on behalf
of others can rarely do so. This explains the strong presumption against
collective litigation. The environmentalist conception of collective litigation as a means of increasing the effective participation of collective
interests is, at bottom, a confusion between interest representation and
legal rights. Such use of legal instruments for political purposes must
be narrowly circumscribed, and the participants must be democratically
organized, so as to make their participation compatible with the representative-democratic organization of government as a whole.
In the United States, there have been no comparable attempts to
separate law from politics, to distinguish among different senses of participation, and to hold collective litigants and intervenors to standards
of representativeness and democratic organization. American public
interest organizations have an ambiguous status. It is never quite clear
whether they are "concerned citizens" who happen to assert their rights
in unison, or whether they are organizations that represent, in a meaningful sense, some political constituency or other. Proposals to license
public interest groups, to limit their number, and to require them to
meet strict standards of internal democratic organization, which in Germany are considered unobjectionable and are sometimes explicitly supported by the advocates of associational standing, 22 9 would, no doubt,
be met by the argument that such restrictions on the "rights" of "concerned citizens" is out of the question. On the other hand, suggesting
that public interest lawyers really represent no one in particular is routinely countered by the argument that their organizations have hundreds of thousands of members.
This hybrid form of political-legal influence seems acceptable
because there is no clear sense of sovereign, intrinsically public author227. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
228. The literature on association lawsuits strongly suggests this conclusion. Bettermann, Zur Verbandsklage, 85 ZErrsCHRIFrT FR ZIvILPROZESS 133, 144 (1972) (association lawsuits, if to be permitted at all, can only be considered for representative,
democratic organizations). See also Breuer, llirksamerer L'nweltschui: durch Reform des
'erwaltungsverfahrens und Verwaltnigsprozessrechts?, 1978 NEUE JURISTIcHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1558, 1562, 1566; FABER, DIE VERBANDSELAGE IM VERWALTUNGSPROZESS 6466, 91 (standing to sue could be offered as a kind of reward for groups with democratic structure); W. Schmidt, Bff)gerinilialiven-politische ll'illensbildung-Saatsgewalt,
1978 Juristen-Zeitung 293, 297 (supports and documents scholarly consensus that
association standing should not be permitted and could, at most, be considered for

organizations with democratic structure); and TEUBNER,

ORGANISATIONSDEMORRATIE
214-21 (1978).
in CONTRA UND PRO VERBANDSKLAGE 16-18 (1976).

UND VERBANDSVERFASSUNG

229. E.g., Rehbinder,
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ity. In contrast to the "German" concerns over precisely who is entitled
to participate in the exercise of public authority, on what conditions, and
in what form, the American debate about public interest litigation has
been dominated by concerns over the balance of forces within the political process. Accordingly, the legitimacy of collective litigation is said to
stem from the fact that it helps to balance the influence of organized
interests.
VII.

Conclusion

The determined rejection of collective litigation on behalf of "under
represented interests" in the Federal Republic may strike American
observers as unduly restrictive and perhaps a bit authoritarian. If for no
other reason, two final remarks are in order. First, the concerns that
motivate the rigorous separation of law and politics, rights and interests,
and, hence, high standing barriers in the Federal Republic are neither
purely metaphysical nor primarily authoritarian. German law excludes
public interest claims in order to protect political control over executive
decision-making. While this may sound autocratic, it is based upon the
insight that without political control, there can be no democratic
accountability. German law further excludes public interest claims to
maintain the judiciary's orientation towards rights and its substantive
distance from the bureaucracy. While this may appear to imply an
unduly narrow conception of the judicial function, the underlying objective the preservation of the judiciary's independence is not only legitimate but well-advised in a country where judicial independence has
been very tenuous. German law requires that the organized participants
in political decision-making be democratically organized. While this
insistence discourages spontaneous citizen action, it channels discontent
into organizations and institutions that conform to standards of representative democracy, and prevents the usurpation of public authority by
movements which merely claim to speak for the public.
Second, it may seem that the prohibition on public interest litigation betrays an indifference to substantive public concerns such as a
clean environment. It certainly did seem that way to German environmentalists and to scholars sympathetic to their cause. 2 30 The answer
they received was that the remedy lay in the political process, not in
litigation and in the courts. As it happened, Germany did offer a political remedy. At the same time proposals for collective litigation were
rejected, the established parties became considerably more sensitive to
environmental concerns, and an environmentalist party, the Greens,
gained access to state legislatures and to the Bundestag. The rejection of
public interest litigation did not inhibit this development. If anything, it
encouraged it by directing the attention of environmental activists away
from the courts and towards the electoral process.
230. E.g., Rehbinder, Aigmnente fir die Verbandsklage in Onzwellrecht, 1976
supra note 160.

SCHRIFr FOR RECHTSPOLITIK 157, 159; Sening,
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There may, then, be a functional need to represent collective,"under represented" public interests in representative democracies.
But the case of West Germany illustrates that complex industrial democracies can adjust to this need in more than one way. The American
adjustment of collective litigation is not an inevitable trend but the outcome of particular institutional arrangements and legal-political
traditions.

